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THE FIRST AMENDMENT NEEDS NO REFORM:
PROTECTING LIBERTY FROM CAMPAIGN
FINANCE "REFORMERS"
James Bopp, Jr.' & Richard E. Coleson'
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the Pursuit of Happiness - That to secure these Rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed.. . .
WE the People of the United States, in order to ... secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.2
America was, as President Abraham Lincoln declared at Gettysburg,
"conceived in liberty."3 Lady Liberty graces flags, murals, coins, and the
New York Harbor. She symbolizes an essential American ideal that was
enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment guarantees of
free expression and association: "Congress shall make no law . . .
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1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
2. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
3. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at
Gettsburg (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
17 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or [of] the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."4
Liberty is under assault, however, by self-styled "reformers" seeking to
deprive the people of these foundational rights of our democratic
Republic. The United States Supreme Court has erected a high wall of
separation to demark unfettered issue advocacy (including political
issues) from "express advocacy,"5 which may be regulated due to a
compelling governmental interest. Yet, "reformers" besiege the
bulwark, claiming error in the Supreme Court's bright-line defense of
liberty and asserting pressing reasons to abandon the First Amendment.
In Part I, this Article reviews the construction and necessity of the wall
of separation between express advocacy and unfettered issue advocacy.
The strongly-protected liberty of the people to band together to amplify
their issue advocacy is discussed in Part II. Parts III (McCain-Feingold)
and IV (Shays-Meehan) examine how current campaign finance
"reform" efforts would trespass on liberty's land if implemented.
I. ALTHOUGH ISSUE ADVOCACY AFFECTS ELECTIONS, A HIGH WALL
SEPARATES UNFETTERED ISSUE ADVOCACY FROM EXPRESS
ADVOCACY
Political issue advocacy affects elections. For example, television
advertisements criticizing California Governor Gray Davis for electric
power "gray-outs" may cause voters to reject his reelection bid. Voter
guides published by the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights
Action League (NARAL) or the National Right to Life Committee
(NRLC) may be carried into the voting booths and used to select
candidates favoring or opposing abortion rights. Campaign finance
"reformers" decry this fact and call for regulation of issue advocacy.
They consider ads comprised of issue advocacy as loopholes needing
closure by strict laws.
The First Amendment, however, is not a loophole.6 The amendment
needs no reform. Liberty requires that the freedoms of expression and
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
5. Express advocacy is a technical term referring to expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for public office.
6. See generally James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment is Not
a Loophole: Protecting Free Expression in the Election Campaign Context, 28 UWLA L.
REV. 1 (1997) (setting out a "primer on protected political expression," articulating the
"express advocacy" and "major purpose" tests, tracing the history of failed FEC efforts to
regulate issue advocacy, and offering proposals for speech-enhancing campaign reform);
[Vol. 51:785
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association, which are the bedrock of our Republic, are protected,
especially in the context of political debate and election campaigns.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
the First Amendment mandates protection of issue advocacy even though
it affects elections. The Court's decision belied the claim of some
"reformers" that the Court was not sufficiently farsighted to see the
effect that issue advocacy would eventually have in influencing elections:
Public discussion of public issues which also are campaign issues
readily and often unavoidably draws in candidates and their
positions, their voting records and other official conduct.
Discussions of those issues, and as well more positive efforts to
influence public opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably
to exert some influence on voting at elections.8
The Court declared that this liberty is fully protected, and it explicitly
endorsed the use of issue advocacy to influence elections by promoting
candidates and their views: "So long as persons and groups eschew
expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want
to promote the candidate and his views."9 For those who argue that the
express advocacy test was ill considered by the Supreme Court, a review
of Buckley belies that claim also. The Court reiterated the express
advocacy test in eight different passages throughout its opinion.'0
The fact that issue advocacy affects election campaigns makes it less,
not more, subject to regulation because "the constitutional guarantee [of
free expression] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to
the conduct of campaigns for political office."" This is so because free
expression is both vital in its own right and essential to representative
government. 2 "In a republic where the people [and not their legislators]
are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices
among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who
are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation."'3
Indeed, this motif of the people's sovereignty versus incumbents' wish
to be free from citizen groups trumpeting both the candidates' views and
Wanda Franz & James Bopp, Jr., The Nine Myths of Campaign Finance Reform, 10 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REv. 63 (1998).
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
8. Id. at 42 n.50 (quoting the court of appeals decision).
9. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 43, 44, 44 n.52, 45 (twice), 80 (thrice).
11. Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
12 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,257 n.10 (1986) (MCFL).
13. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
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votes on vital issues of the day is the true center of gravity in Congress in
the campaign finance reform conflict. 4 However, the Constitution's
Preamble makes plain what the Court has reiterated and what certain
"reformers" have neglected, that "[wje the People of the United States"
established and control this government. 5 Therefore, the people's right
to speak out about issues and candidates is paramount.
The Supreme Court clearly articulated why protecting the people's
free expression right required a high wall of separation between issue
and express advocacy in the seminal case, Buckley v. Valeo.6 The Court,
faced with constitutional questions regarding the post-Watergate
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), struggled
with the question of what type of speech could be constitutionally subject
to government regulation. The FECA was written broadly, subjecting to
regulation any expenditures on speech that were made "relative to a
clearly identified candidate"'8 or "for the purpose of . . . influencing"
the nomination or election of candidates for public office. 9
14. For example, in a press release available on Senator Thad Cochran's Web site,
Cochran provided some reasons why he had switched from opposing campaign finance
"reform" to supporting it: "Candidates are unable to compete with independent groups...
." Senator Thad Cochran, Senator Cochran's Statement on Campaign Reform, at
http://www.senate.gov/-cochran/press/pr01040.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2001). He
declared: "I think we have a system now that is too heavily influenced by fundraising and
the spending of money not just by candidates, but other groups .... I just think that the
whole system has become overwhelmed by organizations which use enormous sums of
money to influence campaigns." Id. Cochran apparently believes that the free speech and
association rights of the people hinge on whether candidates can compete. Ironically, he
declared that "we should protect ... [political parties'] role," but he supports McCain-
Feingold, which does the opposite. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. Id. at 18-19. The fact that campaign finance laws regulate the spending of money
on speech, rather than the speech itself, does not change the constitutional analysis. As
the Buckley Court explained:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and
the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.
Id. at 19. Thus, "[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a
ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one
desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id. at 19 n.18.
18. Section 608(e)(1) limited expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a
clearly identified candidate" to $1,000 per year.
19. Section 431(e) and (f) defined the terms "contribution" and "expenditure" for the
purposes of FECA's disclosure requirements in then Section 434(e).
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The Court recognized that the difference between issue and candidate
advocacy often dissipated in the real world:
[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates
and advocacy of [the] election or defeat of candidates may often
dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving
legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do
candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various
public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of
public interest. 0
The dilemma was whether to regulate issue advocacy, as it might
influence an election, or to protect issue advocacy, because it is vital to
the conduct of our representative democracy and influences elections.
The Court recognized that "a major purpose of [the First] Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of course
includ[ing] discussions of candidates."2 The Court declared advocacy of
public and political issues an unfettered liberty:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."2
To protect the liberty to advocate political issues, the Court erected a
high wall to protect issue advocacy. The wall was the express advocacy
test, which limited government regulation to communications that
"expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate."' 3  The Court narrowed the application of FECA's
contribution and expenditure disclosure provisions to express advocacy
to prevent both unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth.2 4
The Buckley Court considered whether the interest in preventing
actual or apparent corruption of candidates, found sufficiently
compelling to justify contribution limits, justified regulating political
20. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
21. Id. at 14 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966)).
22. Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 80. To ensure that there was not any confusion about the meaning of
express advocacy, the Court gave examples of such express terms - "'vote for,' 'elect,'
'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' Id.
at 44 n.52.
24. Id. at 80; see also Bopp & Coleson, supra note 6, at 14.
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issue advocacy.25 The Court determined that issue advocacy could not be
regulated even though it could potentially be abused to obtain improper
benefits from candidates.26
To fully protect issue advocacy, the Court's express advocacy test
focused on the words actually spoken by the speaker, requiring that they
be words like "vote for" or "elect,, 27 not on the intent of the speaker or
whether the effect of the message would be to influence an election:
[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short of
invitation [to vote for or against a candidate] would miss [the]
mark is a question both of intent and of effect. No speaker, in
such circumstances, safely could assume that anything he might
say upon the general subject would not be understood by some
as an invitation. In short, the supposedly clear-cut distinction
between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and
solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly at
the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and
consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his
intent and meaning .... Such a distinction offers no security
for free discussion. In these conditions it blankets with
uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the speaker to
hedge and trim?
A decade later, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), the
Court reaffirmed the high wall separating unfettered political or public
issue advocacy from express advocacy that could be regulated. 9
25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13-14.
26. Id. at 45-46.
27. Id. at 44 n.52. The express advocacy test is not a "magic words" test, i.e., so long
as the words used in footnote fifty-two of the Buckley opinion are avoided, political
speakers avoid regulation. Id. at 44 & n.52. Footnote fifty-two creates an "express words
of advocacy test": "This construction would restrict the application of § 608(e)(1) to
communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote
for,'...." Id. at 44 n.52 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 43 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). While "reformers" often espouse
the view that the express advocacy test was intended only to fix the vagueness problem,
which this passage addresses, they ignore the Court's confirmation that the express
advocacy limitation was also imposed on the FECA "to avoid problems of overbreadth."
MCFL, 479 U.S. 238,248-49 (1986) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80).
29. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249 ("We therefore hold that an expenditure must constitute
'express advocacy' in order to be subject to the prohibition in § 441b... finding of 'express
advocacy' depend[s] upon the use of language such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' etc.")
(citation omitted). MCFL adds another stream of reason and authority to the protection
of issue advocacy. The Court held that nonprofit ideological corporations that do not
serve as conduits for business corporation contributions cannot even be prohibited from
making independent expenditures, such as expenditures expressly advocating a
candidate's election or defeat, or contributions to candidates. Id. at 264-65. A fortiori
[Vol. 51:785
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The lower federal courts and state courts that have been faced with
restrictions on issue advocacy have faithfully adhered to the express
advocacy test according to its plain terms.0 The weight of authority is
substantial. The express advocacy test means exactly what it says -
political issue advocacy is protected, and campaign finance statutes
regulating more than explicit words expressly advocating the election or
defeat of clearly identified candidates are impermissibly broad under the
First Amendment."
these common issue advocacy groups cannot be prohibited from engaging in issue
advocacy.
30. Lower federal court cases recognizing constitutional protection for unfettered
issue advocacy include: Me. Right to Life Comm. v. FEC, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996);
Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991); Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d
376 (2d Cir. 2000); FEC v. Cent. Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d
45 (2d Cir. 1980); Virginia Society for Human Life v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001);
Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000); N.C. Right To Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d
705 (4th Cir. 1999); Va. Soc'y For Human Life v. Caldwell, 152 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1998);
FEC v. Christian Action Network, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996) (CAN 1); FEC v. Christian
Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997) (CAN If); Brownsburg Area Patrons
Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1998); Iowa Right to Life Comm. v.
Williams, 187 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 1999); FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Furgatch contains broad dicta, but the Fourth Circuit summarized the narrower holding
as: "where political communications... include an explicit directive to voters to take some
[unclear] course of action, ... 'context' ... may be considered in determining whether the
action urged is the election or defeat of a ... candidate .... '" CAN II, 110 F.3d at 1054);
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174
(10th Cir. 2000); Fla. Right to Life v. Lamar, 238 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming Fla.
Right to Life v. Mortham, No. 98-770CIVORL19A, 1999 WL 33204523 (M.D. Fla. 1999)).
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd,
59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 518 U.S. 604
(1996); FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999); FEC v. NOW, 713 F.
Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1989); FEC v. AFSCME, 471 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1979); Kansans for
Life, Inc. v. Gaede, 38 F. Supp. 2d 928 (D. Kan. 1999); Clifton v. FEC, 927 F. Supp. 493
(D. Me. 1996), affd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 1309 (1st Cir. 1997); Planned Parenthood
Affiliates of Mich. v. Miller, 21 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Right to Life of Mich.,
Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Mich 1998); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108
F. Supp. 2d 498 (E.D.N.C. 2000); Right To Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F.
Supp. 2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, No. 98 Civ. 0347, 1994 WL
9658, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 65 F.3d 285
(2d Cir. 1995); Oklahomans for Life v. Luton, No. CIV-00-1163, slip. op. (W.D. Okla. May
25,2001); West Virginians For Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
State cases recognizing constitutional protection of unfettered issue advocacy include:
Alaska v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999); Conn. v. Proto, 526
A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1987); Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1998); Brownsburg Area
Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714 N.E. 2d 135 (Ind. 1999); Klepper v. Christian
Coalition, 259 A.D.2d 926 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31 (Tex.
2000); Va. Soc'y for Human Life v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 814 (Va. 1998); Wash. State
Republican Party v. Wash. State Public Disclosure Comm'n, 4 P.3d 808 (Wash. 2000);
Elections Bd. v. Wisconsin Mfr. & Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721 (Wisc. 1999).
31. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
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II. ASSOCIATION TO AMPLIFY ISSUE ADVOCACY IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED
The people's issue advocacy groups, labor unions, and political parties
are private organizations that provide a vehicle for average citizens to
effectively participate in the political process, by pooling resources
resources to amplify the citizens' voices in order to advocate issues of
public concern, lobby for legislation, and directly promote the election of
candidates. The wealthy and powerful have no such need, but citizen
groups are a vital populist tool for maintaining that equality envisioned
in the Declaration of Independence.
The pejorative use of the term "special interests" by campaign finance
"reformers" to refer to authentic citizen groups, as opposed to business
interests where the notion might have some applicability, displays a
profound ignorance of constitutional rights and of the vital contributions
such organizations make as mediating elements in the social structure.
Authentic grassroots citizen groups are not part of the problem this
nation faces; they are part of the solution. Americans, from the
beginning, have been a nation of joiners. As Alexis de Tocqueville
observed nearly two centuries ago, such associationalism is part of the
genius of America: "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all
dispositions constantly form associations."32 He added that
[i]n democratic countries the science of association is the
mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the
progress it has made.
Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which
seems to be more precise and clear than all the others. If men
are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating
together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the
equality of conditions is increased.33
Tocqueville elaborated on the necessity of associations as a check on
governmental power, despite the resistance of incumbent government
officials to associations and the misguided mistrust some people feel for
associations, in words that seem targeted at current campaign finance
"reform" efforts, but for the fact that they were written in 1840:
Among democratic nations it is only by association that the
resistance of the people to the government can ever display
itself; hence the latter always looks with ill favor on those
associations which are not in its power; and it is well worthy of
32. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Phillips Bradley,
ed. Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1840) (chap. V, para. 2).
33. Id. at 110 (chap. V, para. 14).
[Vol. 51:785
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remark that among democratic nations the people themselves
often entertain against these very associations a secret feeling of
fear and jealousy, which prevents the citizens from defending
the institutions of which they stand so much in need. The
power and duration of these small private bodies in the midst of
the weakness and instability of the whole community astonish
and alarm the people, and the free use which each association
makes of its natural powers is almost regarded as a dangerous
privilege.34
Tocqueville continued by warning of the danger of permitting incumbent
government officials to control the people's associations:
Among all European nations there are some kinds of
associations or companies which cannot be formed until the
state has examined their by-laws and authorized their existence.
In several others attempts are made to extend this rule to all
associations; the consequences of such a policy, if it were
successful, may easily be foreseen.
If once the sovereign has a general right of authorizing
associations of all kinds upon certain conditions, he would not
be long without claiming the right of superintending and
managing them, in order to prevent them from departing from
the rules laid down by himself. In this manner the state, after
having reduced all who are desirous of forming associations into
dependence, would proceed to reduce into the same condition
all who belong to associations already formed; that is to say,
almost all men who are now in existence.
Tocqueville highlighted the vital importance of associations in
democracies as bulwarks against the dangers of majoritarianism,
despotism, and conspiracies: "At the present time the liberty of
association has become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the
majority .... There are no countries in which associations are more
needed to prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a
prince than those which are democratically constituted." 6 The freedom
to associate "offers a security against dangers of another kind; in
countries where associations are free, secret societies are unknown. In
America there are factions, but no conspiracies." 37
34. Id. at 311-12 (chap. V, para. 31).
35. Id. at 312 (chap. V, paras. 32-33).
36. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 194-95 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1835) (chap. XII, paras. 13-14).
37. Id. at 195 (chap. XII, para. 16).
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Tocqueville concluded that free association is an inalienable right and
issued a warning seemingly targeted directly at campaign finance
"reformers":
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for
himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his
fellow creatures, and of acting in common with them. The right
of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in
its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can
attack it without impairing the foundations of society.
The decline of associationalism and its accompanying social capital -
symbolized by "bowling alone"39 - is a matter of contemporary concern.
Authentic citizen groups indeed have interests to advance, but such
associationalism is an essential dynamic of democracy. They should be
encouraged, not demonized.
The right to associate and the ability of average citizens to thereby
affect public policy are so essential to our democratic Republic that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized free association as a
fundamental right with powerful constitutional protections. This liberty
to associate, like political speech, is a First Amendment right and "the
constitutional guarantee [of the First Amendment] has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office."' The right was articulated well in NAACP v. Alabama41 when
the Supreme Court rejected Alabama's attempt to compel disclosure of
the membership list of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.4 The unanimous Court strongly affirmed constitutional
protection for free political association:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized
by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to
38. Id. at 196 (chap. XII, para. 17) (emphasis added).
39. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: AMERICA'S DECLINING SOCIAL
CAPITAL (1995). Putnam's insights were based, in part, on his twenty-year study of Italy.
Id. at 344-46. He chronicled the political results of the northern regional governments'
emphasis on associationalism (resulting in trust, cooperation, and successful government)
versus the southern regional governments' emphasis on radical autonomy (resulting in
distrust, discord, and unsuccessful government). Id. at 344-46 (noting that Putnam
published his findings in MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993)).
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (emphasis added).
41. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
42. Id. at 466.
[Vol. 51:785
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engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny.43
The Court held that "[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may
in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs."
'
4
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional protection
for association: "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association .... [Consequently,] the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee 'freedom to associate with others for the common
advancement of political beliefs and ideas.' 45 The Court reiterated that
"action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate
is subject to the closest scrutiny." 46 This highest level of constitutional
protection flows from the essential function of associations in allowing
effective participation in our democratic Republic. Organizations from
political action committees (PACs) to ideological corporations, labor
unions, and political parties, exist to permit "amplified individual
speech.
47
These powerful constitutional protections for the political liberties of
unfettered issue advocacy and association are the benchmarks against
which to measure the two key campaign finance reform proposals for
43. Id. at 460-61 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 462 (internal quotation and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
45. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)). When only
an associational interest is involved, as with limits on cash contributions to candidates, the
government need only demonstrate that the "contribution regulation was 'closely drawn'
to match a 'sufficiently important interest."' Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 387-88 (2000). However, when speech is limited, the statute is subject to strict
scrutiny, requiring the government to demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored
to advance a compelling governmental interest. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-65. This is the
same standard employed for expressive association. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct.
2446, 2456-57 (2000); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
47. Democratic Party of the United States v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 578 F. Supp.
797, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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2001: McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan. Both bills fall beyond the
constitutional pale.4
I1. MCCAIN-FEINGOLD ASSAILS THESE POLITICAL LIBERTIES
"Many of the so-called reforms floating around Washington are in fact
nothing more than incumbent protection acts ... Many politicians feel
threatened by negative advertisements and want to control what is said
during campaigns."49 Others want to reduce spending on campaigns,
particularly by "outside" groups.5O
Chief among these proposals is McCain-Feingold, the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2001 (McCain-Feingold),5" sponsored
principally by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold. Though
announced with the promise of reducing the corrupting influence of big
money, McCain-Feingold is instead a broad attack on citizen
participation in our democratic Republic. As a result, the bill enhances
the power of already powerful wealthy individuals, incumbent politicians,
and large news corporations at the expense of the "little guy."
The two weeks of Senate debate and action on amendments to
McCain-Feingold had a predictable outcome - serving the respective
Senators' electoral self-interests. For example, the Senate approved
increased contribution limits to candidates52 and price controls for
candidate broadcast advertisements53 that fill candidate campaign chests.
The Senate also adopted an amendment that raises candidate
48. See infra Parts Ill & IV.
49. Comments of House Majority Whip Tom Delay, MONEY & POLITICS REPORT 1
(May 26, 1999). The comments of Senator Bingaman, when introducing a proposed
amendment to McCain-Feingold requiring broadcasters to give candidates free equivalent
air time to respond to citizen group ads that "attack or oppose" a candidate, reveals this
control motif: "you are conducting a campaign ... addressing the issues voters care about;
you are trying to give the people ... the best vision you can for where this country should
go ... and you turn on the television ... and see an ad attacking you for some issue ... 
147 CONG. REC. S3111 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
50. See 145 CONG. REC. S423 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
Upon the introduction of Senate Bill 27, the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform
Bill of 1999, Senator Russell Feingold stated: "The prevalence-no-the dominance ... of
money in our system of elections and our legislature will in the end cause them to
crumble." Id.
51. McCain-Feingold, S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001). As passed by the Senate, the bill is
available on-line at the U.S. Congress' Web site. Thomas, at http://thomas.loc.gov (last
visited Apr. 16, 2001).
52. 147 CONG. REC. S3002 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001) (Thompson amendment, Senate
Amend. 149).
53. 147 CONG. REC. S2600 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (Toricelli amendment, Senate
Amend. 122).
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contribution limits when candidates face wealthy opponents who
substantially finance their own campaign.
The Senate defeated amendments that would have reduced the flow of
money to incumbent politicians, such as the Bennett amendment, which
would ban the use of corporate and labor union treasury funds to pay the
administrative expenses of connected PACs.5 Likewise, the Senate
defeated the Smith amendment, which would have banned contributions
from lobbyists and PACs while Congress was in session." In each of
these cases, the incumbent politicians' personal benefit ruled the day.
Finally, the Senate defeated all efforts to delete or weaken McCain-
Feingold's central provisions,57 which assault the average citizen's ability
to participate in the political process. These provisions target and restrict
citizen groups that serve as the only effective vehicles by which average
citizens may pool their money to express themselves effectively: issue
advocacy groups, labor unions, and political parties.
Campaign finance "reform" proposals do not, and could not, eliminate
the power of the giant news media corporations to promote their special
interests because they are protected by the First Amendment from
regulation of editorial content and news coverage. In addition, the
wealthy may not be prohibited from spending their own money, either to
express their views on public issues and candidates58 or to advocate their
54. 147 CONG. REC. S2595-96 (daily ed. March 20, 2001) (Domenici amendment,
Senate Amend. 115). Obvious questions arise with this so-called "millionaire's
amendment": Because political corruption is the justification for contribution limits, why
would this concern evaporate in the face of wealthy competition for office? Is the
amendment also subject to equal protection attack?
55. 147 CONG. REC. S2550-60 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (Bennett amendment, Senate
Amend. 117).
56. 147 CONG. REc. S2561-67 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (Smith amendment, Senate
Amend. 118).
57. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S3070-76 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (DeWine
amendment, Senate Amend. 152) (noting that the Senate defeated the amendment
striking Title II of S. 27).
58. For example, a billionaire New York financier, Jerome Kohlberg, formed and
almost entirely bankrolled a nonprofit organization called Campaign for America, which
expended nearly $500 thousand in the 1998 election to run independent expenditures
attacking Republican Senate nominee Jim Bunning in Kentucky for opposing so-called
campaign finance reform. Kohlberg is a long-time contributor to liberal Democratic
causes and candidates. The Democratic candidate was Congressman Scotty Baesler, who
has strongly advocated placing severe restrictions on the right of such advocacy groups (he
calls them "special interests") to spend money to praise or criticize federal politicians.
Baesler's own campaign reform bill (House Bill 1366, in 1998) would have prohibited such
expenditures, but he hypocritically made no effort to oppose the expenditures on his
behalf. See FEC Drops Case Involving Reform Group Founded by Financier Jerome
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own respective elections. The wealthy, however, do not need to pool
their resources to be effective because they can pay for communications
about their special interests. Furthermore, millionaire candidates are still
advantaged under McCain-Feingold, despite the Domenici amendment,
because they need not rely on contributions from others; they can spend
their own money to campaign. In addition, officeholders have the
incredible power of incumbency to support their campaigns, which is the
type of power that Senate action on McCain-Feingold sought to enhance.
Thus, campaign finance reform, as proposed by McCain-Feingold, strips
power from the people and gives it to the wealthy and powerful. It is no
wonder that wealthy foundations and individuals are prime supporters of
so-called campaign finance "reform,"5'9 that the main stream media is the
primary cheerleader for it, and that incumbent politicians are so attracted
to it.
A. McCain-Feingold Suppresses Rights of Average Citizens to Participate
in the Political Arena by Pooling Resources Because It Bars Corporations
and Labor Unions from Engaging in Any "Electioneering
Communication"
McCain-Feingold prevents political participation by citizens of average
means by broadly defining "electioneering communication" so that issue
advocacy expenditures currently permitted become forbidden under
federal law for corporations"' and labor unions.6' "Electioneering
Goldberg, MONEY & POLITIcs REPORT, Mar. 22, 2001; First General Counsel's Report,
FEC MUR 4940 (Dec. 21,2000).
59. For example, Public Campaign's founder Ellen Miller has criticized the million-
dollar contributions to political parties, yet she accepted "$1 million from former
Democratic representative Cecil Heftel of Hawaii and $3 million from the foundation of
philanthropist George Soros to pay for her crusade to have taxpayers finance
congressional campaigns." Chuck Raasch, Big Money, With Interest, USA TODAY, June
17, 1997, at A7. Such major donors helped Public Campaign to put together "a $9.2
million, three-year push for the public financing of campaigns." Id. Figures on such major
donations are difficult to establish, however, because when asked to disclose donors (as
McCain-Feingold would require) groups like Public Citizen, Sierra Club Foundation, and
the U.S. Public Interest Research Group all decline. Id.
The extended Gannett News Service article, from which the above article was derived,
provided evidence that major-donor giving to campaign finance "reform" organizations is
on the way up. Chuck Raasch, Do Public Interest Groups That Push Campaign Reform
Really Represent Citizens?, GANNETT NEWS SERV., June 13,1997, at 3. Raasch also noted
that the Schumann Foundation (New Jersey) gave or pledged more than $14 million to
various campaign-finance reform causes between 1994 and 1997 and that Robert
Pambianco, a scholar of campaign-finance reform, stated that contributions to such efforts
"had become trendy among foundations" and were expected to expand. Id. at 4.
60. Section 441.b(a) says "[ijt is unlawful for ... any corporation whatever, or any
labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
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communication" is defined as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication" to "members of the electorate" that "refers to a clearly
identified [federal] candidate... within ... 60 days before a general...
election [or 30 days before primaries, conventions, or caucuses]." 62
This broad definition of "electioneering communication" prohibits
issue advocacy communications traditionally conducted by such
organizations. Because Congress is often in session within sixty days
before a general election and thirty days before a primary, any grassroots
lobbying regarding a bill to be voted on during this sixty-day period
would be prohibited if the broadcast communication named a candidate
by referring to the bill in question or by asking a constituent to lobby his
or her Congressman or Senator. Also, because presidential races include
ongoing primaries, caucuses, and conventions for months leading up to
the election, broadcast advertisements asking constituents to lobby an
official who is also a presidential candidate could potentially be banned
for most of an election year.
With corporations and labor unions prohibited from making such
communications, McCain-Feingold then requires those that may still do
so, that is, individuals and PACs, to file reports with the FEC if they
expend over $10 thousand per year." Among other things, the reports
must list every disbursement over $200 and to whom it was made, the
candidate(s) to be identified, and the identity of all contributors whose
aggregate contribution is $1,000 or more during the year."
Of course, the no-reference test in McCain-Feingold's "electioneering
communication" definition brazenly ignores the high wall of separation
protecting issue advocacy. In Michigan, the Secretary of State
promulgated a materially-identical rule that banned corporate and labor
union communications that contained the "name or likeness of a
candidate" from being made within forty-five days of an election. 6 Two
election." 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)' (2000). McCain-Feingold expands the definition of
"contribution or expenditure" in § 441b(b)(2) to include "any applicable electioneering
communication." S. 27, 107th Cong. § 203 (2001).
61. The AFL-CIO issued a position paper at its Los Angeles executive council
meeting in February 2001, stating strong opposition to McCain-Feingold's restrictions on
"electioneering communication" and "coordinated activities" that would prohibit issue
advocacy by labor unions. AFL-CIO, S. 27 - McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance
Reform Bill (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.aflcio.org/reform/mccainbill.htm.
62. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001). Electioneering communications was added to the
list of activities prohibited by corporations and labor unions. Id. § 203.
63. Id. § 201.
64. Id.
65. See Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 767 (W.D. Mich.
1998).
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traditional adversaries, Right To Life of Michigan and Planned
Parenthood, challenged the rule in separate federal courts and had the
rule declared unconstitutional. 6 Likewise, the Second Circuit struck
down a "notice of expenditure" statute that defined "mass media
activities" as "includ[ing] the name or likeness of a candidate for office"
and required reporting if such occurred "within 30 days of a primary or
general election."67 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit struck down a statute
requiring reporting of expenditures for communications "if the printed
material or advertisement names a candidate."'
Anticipating that the federal courts would strike down a provision that
bans any reference to a candidate during a thirty to sixty day pre-election
period, the Senate adopted an even more egregious definition of
"electioneering communication," in the Specter amendment, which
springs into effect if the thirty or sixty day no-reference ban is stricken.69
Under the replacement definition, the communications must "promote[]
or support[]" or "attack[] or oppose[]" the candidate and be "suggestive
of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against
that candidate."7° Notably, this definition applies all the time, not just for
the thirty or sixty days before an election.7' Congress' definition
blatantly assaults U.S. Supreme Court precedent because it fails to
employ the constitutionally-mandated language and declares that its
definition applies "regardless of whether the communication expressly
advocates a vote for or against a candidate."72
In sum, McCain-Feingold treats issue advocacy communications by
nonprofit corporations and labor unions as express advocacy
communications and organizations participating in issue advocacy as
PACs. However, as already established, Congress is not constitutionally
warranted to regulate issue advocacy.73
66. Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 21 F. Supp. 2d 740, 741, 746
(E.D. Mich. 1998); Right to Life of Mich., 23 F. Supp. 2d at 767, 771.
67. Vt. Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376,379-80 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2883).
68. Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 159 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§163-278.12A).
69. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
70. Id. This language also raises void-for-vagueness constitutionality concerns,




73. See supra Part 1I.
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B. The Minor Exception for Certain Nonprofits - Practically Eliminated
by Amendment - Requires Them to Act Like Quasi-PACs, in Violation of
Constitutional Rights
McCain-Feingold makes a very minor exception for nonprofits: (1)
permitting expenditures for "electioneering communication"; (2)
applying only to those organizations tax exempt under sections 501(c)(4)
or 527 of the Internal Revenue Code; and (3) applying only if
expenditures are made by a quasi-PAC established by the corporation, to
which contributions can only be made by individuals, and all receipts and
disbursements must be reported.74
The first thing to note about this minor exception is that it only applies
to section 501(c)(4) and section 527 organizations. All other nonprofits
are excluded from engaging in issue advocacy for a couple of months
prior to an election, including section 501(c)(3) organizations, veterans
groups, trade associations, and labor unions. These organizations, using
existing resources, are still prohibited from making such
communications. Notably, most issue-advocacy organizations are
organized under section 501(c)(3).
Furthermore, a quasi-PAC is required to report all contributors of
$1,000 or more.75 This is a very substantial burden because it exposes
contributors to harassment and intimidation by ideological foes.76 In
74. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 203 (2001). Furthermore, if the "electioneering
communication" is "coordinated" with a candidate's election, it is subject to candidate
contribution limits. Id. § 214. Moreover, a "501(c)(4) organization that derives amounts
from business activities or receives funds from any [corporation] ... shall be considered to
have paid for any communication out of such amounts unless such organization paid for
the communication out of [the quasi-PAC fund]." Id. § 203. Section 203 applies
regardless of whether the business income flows from the sale of items closely related to
the ideological issue of the nonprofit (e.g., sale of pro-life literature by the National Right
to Life Committee), how minimal the corporate contributions are, whether
"electioneering communication" is the major purpose of the organization, or whether the
organization poses any threat of quid pro quo corruption, contrary to the teaching of the
federal courts in several cases. See, e.g., Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (8th Cir.
1994).
75. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
76. Campaign finance "reformer" organizations accept major donations (e.g., Public
Campaign accepted "$1 million from former Democratic representative Cecil Heftel of
Hawaii and $3 million from the foundation of philanthropist George Soros"), but then
declined to disclose their donors. Chuck Raasch, Big Money, With Interest, USA TODAY,
June 17, 1997, at A7.
The extended Gannett News Service article, from which the above article was derived,
gave the reasons stated by these organizations for not wanting to disclose their donors.
Note the irony of the answers given in light of the donor disclosure requirements that
McCain-Feingold would impose on other citizen advocacy groups that obviously have
similar rights and interests:
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Buckley, the United States Supreme Court held that such burdens could
not be applied to issue-oriented groups because disclosure of private
associations is an unconstitutional burden.77
What McCain-Feingold initially seemed to offer, it promptly withdrew
with the adoption of the Wellstone amendment. As amended, the
preceding exception applies only where the communication is not
"targeted." 7 For example, broadcast communications are targeted when
they are aimed "primarily [at] residents of the State for which the...
candidate is seeking office.,
79
C. McCain-Feingold Prohibits Corporations and Labor Unions from
Engaging in Any "Coordinated Expenditure"
McCain-Feingold prohibits corporations and labor unions from
funding any "coordinated expenditure."" Originally the bill banned
"coordinated activity," but Senator McCain acknowledged that the ban
was unconstitutionally overbroad when he submitted a successful
Top officials in Public Citizen and the Sierra Club Foundation, a separate tax-
exempt offshoot of the environmental organization, argued that divulging their
donor list either would give an unfair advantage to competitors or unfairly
expose identities of their members.
As I'm sure you are aware, citizens have a First Amendment right to form
organizations to advance their common goals without fear of investigation on
harassment." Public Citizen President Joan Claybrook told GNS." . . . We
respect our members' right to freely and privately associate with others who
share their beliefs, and we do not reveal their identities. We will not violate their
trust simply to satisfy the curiosity of Congress, or even the press."...
Bruce Hamilton, national conservation director for the Sierra Club
Foundation, said... "[t]hat is basically like saying. .. 'give us your membership.
.. ' In effect, it is saying, "we want public disclosure of the 650,000 members of
the Sierra Club," which is a valuable resource, coveted by others, because they
can turn around and make their own list.
And it can also be turned around and used against them. We have members
in small towns in Wyoming, Alaska, (who could be hurt) if word got out they
belonged to the Sierra Club.
Chuck Raasch, Do Public Interest Groups That Push Campaign Reform Really Represent
Citizens?, GANNEqr NEWS SERV., June 13, 1997, at 3.
77. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-45 (1976); see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 462 (1958) (mandating that disclosure of contributors violates privacy of donors and
inhibits free association).
78. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 204.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 214; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000). "Coordinated expenditure" is "a
payment made in concert or cooperation with, at the request or suggestion of, or pursuant
to any general or particular understanding with, such candidate, the candidate's authorized
political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents." S. 27,
107th Cong. § 214 (2001) (emphasis added).
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amendment to alter the language." The new language still uses
overbroad and vague terminology that will convert many constitutionally
permissible expenditures into forbidden contributions.
McCain-Feingold instructs the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to
create regulations to implement the definition of coordinated
expenditure and specifies that the new regulations "shall not require
collaboration or agreement to establish coordination." '  This
coordination provision suffers several constitutional flaws: (1) "general
understanding" is unconstitutionally vague; (2) "coordinated
expenditure" is overbroad because it includes issue advocacy and is not
justified by a compelling governmental interest; (3) "coordinated
expenditure" without "collaboration or agreement" is overbroad; and (4)
while PACs could do "coordinated expenditures," they are limited by
contribution limits, virtually eliminating constitutionally protected
independent expenditures.
1. "General Understanding"Is Unconstitutionally Vague
A "coordinated expenditure" includes "a payment made ... pursuant
to any general.., understanding with [a] candidate." ' The term "general
understanding" is unconstitutionally vague because it provides no notice
to organizations, subject to civil and criminal sanctions, as to what
activity is prohibited. The express advocacy test was created in Buckley
to cure vagueness in FECA and should be employed here for the same
81. 147 CONG. REc. S3184-87, S3193-94 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2001) (SA 165).
82. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001) (emphasis added).
83. Id. FECA bans a corporate/labor union "contribution or expenditure." 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a) (2000). The phrase "contribution or expenditure" is defined in § 441b(b)(2).
"Contribution" is further defined in § 431(8). McCain-Feingold, however, amends this
definition by adding language that implements its drastically expanded coordination
theory of "contribution" by listing a "coordinated expenditure" and an expenditure
coordinated with a political party as contributions regardless of whether they involve
express advocacy. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001). The bill also amends § 431(8) by
adding the definition of "coordinated activity." Id. McCain-Feingold then adds additional
language to define "coordinated expenditure or other disbursement" using its broad
"general understanding" language. Id. A consequence of adding the expanded definition
of "coordinated activity" to the definition of "contribution" in § 431(8) is that an
organization whose major purpose becomes "coordinated activity" is deemed to be a
federal PAC and therefore subject to all PAC limitations and regulations. Of course, issue
advocacy cannot properly be counted as political speech that renders an organization a
PAC. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing the protected nature of
unfettered issue advocacy).
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reason. Vital First Amendment rights require bright-line protection so
that speakers need not "hedge and trim."'
2. "Coordinated Expenditure" Is Overbroad Because It Includes Issue
Advocacy and Is Not Justified by a Compelling Governmental Interest
In addition to serving as a bulwark against vagueness, the express
advocacy test also prevents overbreadth in the First Amendment area.8'
To prevent overbreadth, the Supreme Court held that the government
only has an interest in regulating speech that "expressly advocate[s] the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."" Therefore, the
express advocacy test should govern coordinated expenditures just as it
did for uncoordinated expenditures in Buckley and MCFLY
The FEC's efforts to regulate issue advocacy as coordinated
expenditures have twice been struck down.' A federal court in Colorado
rejected the FEC's attempts to extend its coordination regulations into
the realm of issue advocacy, finding that "the fact that [the coordination
provision] implicates first amendment freedoms argues for adoption of
the more narrowly defined 'express advocacy' interpretation in order to
minimize intrusions." 9 Therefore, the court concluded "that 'express
advocacy' is required in order for a coordinated expenditure to be 'in
connection with' the general election campaign."
A federal court in Maine also blocked efforts to treat issue advocacy as
coordinated, holding that "as long as the Supreme Court holds that
expenditures for issue advocacy have broad First Amendment
protection, the FEC cannot use the mere act of communication between
a corporation and a candidate to turn a protected expenditure for issue
advocacy into an unprotected contribution to the candidate." 9'
84. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 535 (1945)).
85. Id. Regulation that extends beyond the government's compelling interest is
overbroad. See id.
86. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1986) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80).
87. For a fuller discussion of why coordinated expenditures must exclude issue
advocacy and the lowered governmental interest in regulating such expenditures see
James Bopp, Jr. & Heidi K. Abegg, The Developing Constitutional Standards for
"Coordinated Expenditures": Has the Federal Election Commission Finally Found a Way
to Regulate Issue Advocacy?, 1 ELECTION L.J. 209 (2002).
88. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1454-55
(D. Colo. 1993); Clifton v. FEC, 927 F. Supp. 493, 496-500 (D. Me. 1996).
89. Colo. Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1454.
90. Id. at 1455.
91. Clifton, 927 F. Supp. at 500.
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Even the lone federal district court to allow some theoretical
regulation of coordinated issue advocacy would only permit regulations
that reach slightly beyond the area of express advocacy.2 The federal
district court in Washington, D.C. theorized that the FEC might be
allowed to regulate payments for advertisements so close to the express
advocacy threshold that they "would be every bit as beneficial to the
candidate as a cash contribution of equal magnitude," such as "gauzy
candidate profiles prepared for television broadcast or use at a national
political convention" or "coordinated attack advertisements, through
which a candidate could spread a negative message about her
opponent."93
In contrast, the circuit court in Washington, D.C. upheld the FEC's
recognition that the express advocacy requirement was vital to its
regulatory scheme and that its regulatory power therefore did not reach
corporate donations for a non-political picnic sponsored by a committee
and organized by a Congressman. 94 In that case, the FEC followed a
clear and objective test "for distinguishing between political and non-
political congressional events," establishing that "[a]n event is non-
political if (1) there is an absence of any communication expressly
advocating the nomination or election of the congressman appearing or
the defeat of any other candidate, and (2) there is no solicitation, making,
or acceptance of a campaign contribution for the congressman in
connection with the event."95 Although the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit stopped short of holding the FEC's express
advocacy test to be constitutionally required in the context of
coordinated expenditures, it did uphold the test as "logical, reasonable,
and consistent with the overall statutory framework."' This description
does not apply to the far-reaching and standardless approach that
McCain-Feingold proposes."'
McCain-Feingold's effort to turn express advocacy independent
expenditures into prohibited corporate contributions by means of a
broad definition of coordination also bears close examination with
respect to whether a compelling interest could justify such intrusion on
First Amendment rights. The governmental interest in banning
92. See generally FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999).
93. Id. at 88.
94. Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (describing the picnic); id. at
160 (giving the FEC's position); id. at 165-67 (upholding the FEC's position).
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id. at 167.
97. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
corporate contributions is the concern that a corporation may skew the
political process by advocating the election or defeat of candidates
through the use of large quantities of funds obtained, not from
contributors interested in the corporation's political agenda, but from
investors interested in making money through the corporate form.98
Requiring disclosure of independent expenditures on express advocacy
is permissible because it "lessens the risk that individuals will spend
money to support a candidate as a quid pro quo for special treatment." 99
However, limits on independent expenditures, even limits construed only
to encompass express advocacy expenditures, violate the Constitution.m
Hence, the severity of the burden posed by contribution limits allows
their application only to a subset of the broader category of express
advocacy, which can be subjected to disclosure provisions.
The Court has emphasized that limits on expenditures impose a far
greater burden on speech than limits on contributions: "expenditure
limitations . . . represent substantial rather than merely theoretical
restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech," whereas
contribution limits "entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication."' 0 ' This is because
a "contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate" that "does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated,
symbolic act of contributing. '"'0'
In contrast, a limit on communications "necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.""'3 It is
because of this distinction that contributions are subject to limits that
cannot be imposed upon expenditures."
Although McCain-Feingold seeks to treat the proposed
communications as contributions, the impact of § 441a's limits would be
that of a spending limit rather than a contribution limit. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "coordinated expenditures ... share some of the
constitutionally relevant features of independent expenditures.'0 5
98. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 257-59 (1986).
99. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,356 (1995).
100. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-48 (1976)
101. Id. at 19-21.
102 Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 19.
104. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,386-88 (2000).
105. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 624 (1996).
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Consequently, McCain-Feingold lacks the requisite compelling
governmental interest to justify its conversion of independent
expenditures into prohibited corporate contributions.
There is also an extremely practical reason for avoiding what McCain-
Feingold attempts. If coordination is broadly defined, then many
political activities would prompt complaints to the FEC that would
become burdensome investigations to determine whether coordination
has occurred. If issue advocacy may be a coordinated expenditure, then
every citizen group may be investigated for every communication. The
investigation itself could become a punishing burden.
While theoretically it may be possible to do issue advocacy without
running afoul of its being a prohibited "electioneering communication"
or "coordinated expenditure," only the reckless, foolish, or wealthy and
powerful are likely to try. Particularly in Washington, D.C., the
punishment is in the process. Any organization that does something that
could be deemed of value to a candidate can expect to be the subject of
an FEC complaint and investigation to determine whether the activity
was "coordinated." For instance, publicly praising an officeholder for
her vote on a bill invites investigation by the FEC. In addition, daring to
tell constituents to get an incumbent to change his position on an
upcoming vote could provoke an FEC investigation. This is the world of
ubiquitous FEC investigations that all advocacy groups can expect under
McCain-Feingold.
These "mere" investigations themselves violate the First Amendment.
As the Supreme Court explained when Congress was busy investigating
Communist influence in the 1940s and 1950s, "[t]he mere summoning of
a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, about his beliefs,
expressions or associations is a measure of government[] interference"
with First Amendment freedoms. ""
3. "Coordinated Expenditure" Without "Collaboration or Agreement"
Is Overly Broad
McCain-Feingold instructs the FEC to promulgate rules implementing
this "general understanding" concept of coordination without requiring
"collaboration or agreement. ' '  Under current law, coordination
between a candidate and a citizen group exists only when there is
106. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957); see also Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2000)
(ruling that an investigation by HUD officials unconstitutionally chilled First Amendment
rights).
107. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001).
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actually prior communication about a specific expenditure for a specific
project that effectively puts the expenditure under the candidate's
control or is made based on information provided by the candidate about
the candidate's needs or plans." However, McCain-Feingold expands
"coordination" to include undefined activity absent such "collaboration
or agreement. ' '
For example, if an incorporated ideological organization praised
Senator McCain for his work on campaign finance "reform" early in a
session of Congress and worked with him on promoting such reform
legislation, then coordination could be established as a result of this
general understanding, and, consequently, expenditures by the
organization would be deemed coordinated and would be a contribution
to his campaign."0  This contribution would be illegal because
corporations cannot make contributions to candidates. " '
Under McCain-Feingold, American citizens who communicated or
worked with their elected officials could be punished for making any
subsequent efforts to praise the candidate's issue position or to support
the candidate in his or her campaign because such activity might be
considered a coordinated activity. This is repugnant to our constitutional
scheme of participatory government in a democratic Republic run by and
answerable to the people. In a conceptually related context, Clifton v.
FEC,"2 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit struck down the FEC's
voter guide regulations, which prohibited any oral communications with
candidates in preparation of voter guides."3 The court held that this rule
is "patently offensive to the First Amendment" and that it is "beyond
reasonable belief that, to prevent corruption or illicit coordination, the
108. See infra notes 117-125 & accompanying text (describing the current status of the
law). The FEC has also published final rules governing coordinated expenditures that
defines "coordination" narrowly. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.23(c) (2001). McCain-Feingold
repeals these rules. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001).
109. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001) (amending 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) to include payments
made "pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a candidate or his
campaign machinery").
110. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (2000); S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001).
111. A "contribution" must be reported by a candidate, even if he does not know
about it. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2000). It is a potential crime if he does not. Id. § 437g(d) (if the
violation is found to be "knowing and willful" despite the candidate's assertion of no
knowledge).
112. 114 F.3d 1309 (lst Cir. 1.997).
113. Id. at 1317.
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government could prohibit voluntary discussions between citizens and
their legislators and candidates on public issues." 4
Under McCain-Feingold as introduced, coordination would also have
been presumed if the ideological corporation used the same vendor of
"professional services," including "polling, media advice, fundraising,
campaign research, political advice, or direct mail services (except for
mailhouse services)" if the vendor had worked for a candidate and if the
vendor is retained by the corporation to do work related to that
candidate's election."5  Under the Senate-passed version of McCain-
Feingold, FEC regulations would be required to address the issue of a
common vendor and similar presumably coordinated activities."6
Such presumptions are fatally infirm because coordination must be
proven. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC,"7
the FEC took the position that party expenditures were presumed to be
coordinated with their candidates as a matter of law."' The Supreme
Court rejected this view stating that "[a]n agency's simply calling an
independent expenditure a 'coordinated expenditure' cannot (for
constitutional purposes) make it one. . . . [T]he government cannot
foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels."" 9 The
Court held that there must be "actual coordination as a matter of fact."' 20
Congress or the FEC, therefore, cannot merely recite some factual
scenarios wherein it might be possible, or even probable, that
coordination with candidates takes place and then presume as a matter of
law that it has occurred in such instances.12' To do so, would allow the
government by mere labels to drastically curtail independent
expenditures, which cannot be constitutionally limited.'
22
114. Id. at 1314. Furthermore, McCain-Feingold prohibits officeholders from assisting
a citizen group in fundraising, unless it is for the group's PAC, S. 27, 107th Cong. § 101
(2001), thereby driving an even bigger wedge between officeholders and citizen groups.
115. Senate Bill 27, as introduced in the Senate, is available online at
http://thomas.loc.gov.
116. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001).
117. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
11& Id. at 619.
119. Id. at 621-22 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
120. Id. at 619.
121. See id. at 627.
122. Id. at 627; see also id. at 644-48 (Thomas, J., concurring); FEC v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 47-51 (1976); N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 18-19
(1st Cir. 1996); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 493-94 (D.D.C. 1980); Ga.
Right to Life v. Reid, No. 1:94-cv-2744-RLV (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 1996).
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McCain-Feingold's finding of coordination if there is any general
understanding with the candidate about the expenditure, 23 goes way
beyond the courts' narrow understanding of coordination. Consistent
with other federal courts, in FEC v. Christian Coalition,24 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia held that a
communication
becomes "coordinated[]" where the candidate or her agents can
exercise control over, or where there has been substantial
discussion or negotiation between the campaign and the
spender over, a communication's: (1) contents; (2) timing; (3)
location, mode, or intended audience (e.g., choice between
newspaper or radio advertisement); or (4) "volume" (e.g.,
number of copies of printed materials or frequency of media
spots). Substantial discussion or negotiation is such that the
candidate and spender emerge as partners or joint venturers in
the expressive expenditure, but the candidate and spender need
not be equal partners."-'
This is a far cry from a "general understanding."
4. PACs Could Do a "Coordinated Activity, " but Are Severely Limited
by Contribution Limits, Eliminating Most Independent Expenditures
For any individual or organization (a federal PAC) that can actually do
a "coordinated expenditure," the "coordinated expenditure" would be
limited by contribution limits. 26 So a substantial amount of traditional
"independent expenditures" by PACs would be swept under the control
of McCain-Feingold as contributions and limited because a multi-
candidate PAC can only make a contribution of $5,000 per election to a
candidate.'27
D. For the Few Independent Expenditures Not Trapped by Other
Provisions, Disclosure Must Be Made When Contracting for Media Time,
Creating Opportunity for Mischief by Opposing Candidates
The small number of independent expenditures that are not trapped by
the coordination problem yet are hammered by McCain-Feingold
because the independent expenditure must be reported when a contract
is made for broadcast time, not when the communication is made as
123. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001).
124. 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999).
125. Id. at 92.
126. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2001).
127. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (2001).
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under current law. 18 This substantially advances when reporting is due
and creates a window of opportunity during which incumbent politicians
can try to kill the communication by threatening the broadcaster or
organization's donors with retaliation, contacting corporate board
members to use their influence, or threatening to oppose legislation
favored by the contracting organization or broadcasting corporation.
Common sense dictates rejection of McCain-Feingold's conflation of
an "expenditure 12 1 with an "independent expenditure.""13  While an
expenditure may properly encompass a contract for printing or air time,
no independent expenditure even exists until express advocacy exists,
which in turn depends on communication to an audience. 3' The FEC
understood this in the past,132 as evidenced by its rule at 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.16, defining "independent expenditure":
The term independent expenditure means an expenditure for a
communication by a person expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without
cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any
authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is
not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any
candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate.'33
128. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
129. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (defining "expenditure" as including "any purchase, payment,
distribution.., and a written contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure").
130. 2 U.S.C. § 431(1.7) (stating that "'independent expenditure' means an expenditure
by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
131. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Comments on Proposed Rules at 11
C.ER. Parts 100, 104, and 109 Regarding Independent Expenditure Reporting (June 8,
2001), available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/indexpcomments6-08-01.pdf. Among other
things the comments note that:
Common sense has always told public policy organizations that a printed
independent expenditure communication is reportable when it is posted and that
broadcast express advocacy communications are reportable when put out on the
air. That has been the uniform practice of all organizations in their reporting of
independent expenditures to date under existing rules.
Id. at 6 n,5.
132. At the time of this writing, November 2001, the FEC is apparently in the process
of ill-advised rulemaking - beyond current statutory authority - proposing to require
independent expenditures to be reported when a contract is made for the communication.
Id. at 3 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 23,628). The present authors' comments in opposition may
be viewed on the FEC's Web site at http://www.fec.gov/ register.htm.
133. 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (2001) (underscoring added). This requirement of
communication is clearly correct. The transitive verb "advocate," as in "expressly
advocating," means "[t]o speak, plead, or argue in favor of," which necessarily requires an
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Major public policy organizations routinely buy air time in advance of
elections in key markets in order to have broadcast time available if the
organization decides to make independent expenditures. Then the
airtime may not be used due to strategy reasons (and contracts are
generally no problem because broadcasters usually have ready markets
for freed-up airtime before elections). For example, the organization
may decide that independent expenditures are needed more in a
different race that has just become more critical based on current polling
data.
One example is that of a planned independent expenditure on printed
express advocacy pieces in support of Senatorial candidate John Ashcroft
by the National Right to Life Committee's PAC in the 2000 Missouri
election 4 When Ashcroft's opponent died, National Right to Life
Committee's (NRL) PAC did not think it was necessary to release the
brochures and elected to spend its money on other races. Both contracts
and payments were made, but there was no communication. It would
have been inaccurate and misleading to the public to have such
expenditures reported as independent expenditures.
Another example, typical of major public policy organizations, is found
in NRL PAC's practice of arranging for telemarketing firms to make
express advocacy phone calls into targeted areas at election time. The
general agreement is made well in advance of the election, but the
agreement is only for a set range of expenditures and the rate per call.
At this point, the amount of money that will be available to spend is
unknown, for it has not yet been raised. In what state or races the calls
will be made is unknown; in fact, it may be decided on the day before the
phone calling begins, as last-minute polling indicates where there is a
need. Thus, at the time of the agreement for telemarketing services, the
total amount to be spent is unknown, as is the location of the calls. The
idea of reporting when an agreement for services is made would simply
be unworkable for telemarketing. Express advocacy only comes into
being when the calling begins.
The same is true of print communications. Major organizations often
purchase paper stock in large quantities long before elections. Some
generally used materials, such as brochures, may also be printed in
advance without any knowledge of where the materials will actually be
mailed. The combination of a warehouse full of printed brochures and a
audience as evidenced by the word's etymology. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)).
134. James Bopp, Jr. is General Counsel for the National Right to Life Committee.
Information about NRL PAC is based on personal knowledge.
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paid invoice from the printer does not make an independent expenditure
because an independent expenditure requires communication. Unless
the brochure is put in the mail, there is no communication, no express
advocacy, and no independent expenditure. Therefore, logically, there
could be no reporting of an independent expenditure when a contract for
printing or air time is made because, absent express advocacy
communication to the public, an independent expenditure could not
exist.
As may be seen, the proposal to require reporting of independent
expenditures when contracts are made for printing or air time is both
illogical and unworkable in the real world of major public policy
organizations. The present practice of reporting independent
expenditures when they are communicated is in place because it is the
only reasonable, workable one.
Incumbents, of course, appreciate the proposed legislation because it
would provide advance opportunity to dissuade broadcasters and
newspapers from carrying independent expenditure communications.
Such things do happen.135
McCain-Feingold would provide increased time for such mischief, at
the expense of First Amendment rights. If broadcasters are willing to
cancel advertisements to which they have already committed and that are
in process,136 even though it means they may suffer unwanted publicity
for pulling ads in progress, how much easier will it be for intimidation to
prevail with the extra time the bill would provide before broadcasting
even begins? Candidates seeing reports of contracts would immediately
135. A concrete example is given by the present authors in their Comments on
Proposed Rules at 11 CER. Parts 100, 104, and 109, supra note 131, which may be found,
along with its exhibits, on the FEC's Web site at http://www.fec.gov/register.htm. It
involves the case of National Right to Life PAC v. Friends for Bryan, a 1988 case brought
in state court by NRL PAC against Nevada Governor Richard Bryan's U.S. Senatorial
campaign committee for tortious interference with contractual relations (due to cancelled
broadcast arrangements). See generally Nat'l Right to Life PAC v. Friends of Bryan, 741
F. Supp. 807 (D. Nev. 1990). Other letters using the same boilerplate language as ones
sent in Nevada were employed in North Dakota. The source of this systematic campaign
of intimidation was apparently an October 21, 1988, form letter put in evidence that was
prepared by Robert F. Bauer, Counsel to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, from which the other letters were obviously derived. This letter, obtained by
legal discovery, reveals a well-orchestrated intimidation effort. The evidence revealed
that Governor Bryan's lawyer, Jeffrey L. Eskin, also sent threatening letters to stations
concerning independent expenditure ads by the American Medical Association PAC and
the Auto Dealers and Drivers for Free Trade PAC. This evidence demonstrates what is
usually invisible to the public - a widespread practice of well-planned, systematic
intimidation attempts against broadcasters to gain political advantage.
136. See supra note 135 (discussing NRL PAC's advertisements that were in process).
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demand to see copies of the ads for which the contract had been made,
claiming the ads must be perused for libelous or inaccurate materials
even though the ad scripts might not even have been created yet. As a
result of the opportunity for interference provided by the proposed rule,
even if these efforts only delay ads being aired that would be a
satisfactory result for the opposition.
As a result of the harassment that would likely arise from the advance
reporting of contracts for independent expenditures, many broadcasters
would likely be tempted simply not to accept express advocacy
communications, thereby depriving advocacy organizations of their
opportunity for free speech. The vital ability of Americans to participate
in the political process would therefore be thwarted, to the detriment of
the Republic.
E. The News Media Exception Highlights the Expanded Power McCain-
Feingold Gives Powerful News Corporations and the Wealthy
McCain-Feingold contains an exception from the definition of
"electioneering communication" for "a news story, commentary, or
editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station,"
provided the station is not "owned or controlled by any political party,
political committee, or candidate . . . .""' However, biased news
coverage, whether by slant, tone, manipulation of images, volume of
coverage, or even outright advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate
by a news corporation, is nowhere restricted by McCain-Feingold. While
McCain-Feingold tries to gag ideological corporations, it completely
ignores the powerful business corporations that own major broadcasting
outlets, such as General Electric, which owns NBC; Disney, which owns
ABC; and Microsoft, which co-owns MSNBC. The New York Times and
other newspapers have repeatedly run editorials strongly advocating the
passage of McCain-Feingold, but under McCain-Feingold the many
ideological corporations that oppose such legislation would be gagged.'
38
137. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
138. Running a search on "McCain-Feingold" and "Shays-Meehan" in the archive
search feature of The New York Times' Web site reveals myriad articles lauding the pair.
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2002)). A review of the The New York
Time's abstracts of its own editorials yields the following examples of its glowing praise for
the pair of bills: Editorial, A Win for McCain-Feingold, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A20
("Editorial lauds Senate for rejecting [Senator] Chuck Hagel's watered-down campaign
finance reform bill.) (quoting abstract on Web page); Editorial, Campaign Finance's
Crucial Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at A22 ("Editorial ... says supporters of reform
need to vote for Shays-Meehan and to oppose any 'killer amendments' designed to repel
potential votes.") (quoting abstract from Web page); Editorial, Demanding a Vote on
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While the news media is protected by the same First Amendment as
are other citizen groups, this exception makes plain that McCain-
Feingold is a direct attack only on the average citizen who needs to
exercise his constitutional right of association in order to effectively
participate in the political arena. Similarly, wealthy individuals are not
affected by the McCain-Feingold restrictions. First, if they choose, they
can start or buy a media outlet and use it with impunity to support the
issues and candidates they choose. Second, as individuals, they can do
what is forbidden to corporations and labor unions. Third, they are
unaffected by the donor reporting requirements because there are no
donors to disclose but themselves. Passage of McCain-Feingold will
greatly increase their power vis-a-vis citizens of average means.'39 Thus,
it appears that the multi-million dollar contributions that the wealthiest
individuals and private foundations14' are making to reformer groups
would gain a good return if McCain-Feingold were enacted.
Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2001, at A18 ("Editorial urges House majority that favors
campaign-finance reform to insist that Speaker Dennis Hastert keep his word and allow
fair vote on Shays-Meehan bill; says majority should be prepared to sign discharge petition
forcing Rules Committee to return bill to floor if he fails to schedule immediate vote.")
(quoting abstract from Web page); Editorial, Mr. McCain's Journey, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2001, at A20 ("Editorial hails [Senator] John McCain[] for galvanizing public support for
campaign finance reform over opposition of Republican Congressional leaders.)
(quoting abstract on Web page); Editorial, Perils for Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 2001, at A22 ("Editorial urges Senate to defeat amendment by Republican [Senator]
Chuck Hagel to McCain-Feingold campaign-finance reform bill .... ) (quoting abstract
from Web page); Editorial, The Battle for Shays-Meehan, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at
A20 ("Editorial ... says strict discipline will be required of Democrats, and continued
courage will be required of moderate Republicans who have previously been willing to
vote for reform.") (quoting abstract from Web page); Editorial, The Battle to Save Shays-
Meehan, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2001, at A16 ("This week marks the beginning of yet
another critical phase in the struggle to rescue campaign finance reform ....") (quoting
abstract from Web page).
139. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 313 (2001). McCain-Feingold increases the power of the
wealthy, even as candidates, since it includes a provision prohibiting candidates from using
campaign funds for personal expenses. Id. The wealthy already have the funds to pay
living expenses while campaigning full time. Citizens of average means, however, are
faced with a dilemma - do they campaign only at night and on weekends in order to keep
their job to feed their family, or do they quit their job to campaign full time and face a
crippling loss of family income. Furthermore, this provision benefits all incumbents,
whether wealthy or not, since the government continues to pay them a salary, even though
they are campaigning full time.
140. See, e.g., AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION FOUNDATION, WHO'S BUYING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE "REFORM"? (2001) (The American Conservative Union was an
original plaintiff in Buckley v. Valeo). The report followed the money of who is financing
the campaign for campaign finance reform and concluded that it is "controlled and
financed by liberal Democrats," that "[s]ince 1966, the... 'campaign' has raised and spent
more than $73 million," that "[f]unding the ... campaign are a core of liberal foundations
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F McCain-Feingold Further Limits Average Citizen Participation in the
Political Arena by Restricting the Activities of Political Parties
McCain-Feingold reflects the Senate's woeful ignorance of - or
outright disdain for - the constitutionally protected role political parties
play in our democratic Republic. With its misguided goal of eliminating
so-called soft money,14' McCain-Feingold has two dramatic adverse
effects on political party activity: it imposes federal election law limits on
state and local political party activities and it dramatically limits the issue
advocacy, legislative, and organizational activities of political parties.
These effects are neither desirable nor constitutional. The Supreme
Court has said "[w]e are not aware of any special dangers of corruption
associated with political parties. ... ""' That assertion is backed both by
the case law and by the overwhelming political science evidence
concerning how political parties operate.
Haley Barbour, the former Chairman of the Republican National
Committee, defined a political party as "an association of like-minded
people who debate issues, who attempt to influence government policy,
and who work together to elect like-minded people to local, State and
Federal office."'4 Therefore, political parties are first associations of
people, not simply repositories for campaign contributions or "super-
PAC's." Second, political parties have a legitimate role in debating
issues, promoting ideas, and in formulating public policy. Third, national
parties have significant local and state components, they are national, not
federal, committees. National parties exist for the purpose of electing
federal and state candidates and for affecting federal and state public
policy. National parties have considerable, constitutionally protected
interests in participating in state and local elections.
In FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
(Colorado Republican I1),14 the Supreme Court held that political parties
are essentially just like every other group, so that they logically can do
the same things other groups can do. 4' For example, political parties can
who also finance other ultra-liberal organizations and causes," and that one major donor
to the campaign has been George Soros, who since 1997 "has provided $4.7 million." Id.
at ix. The report is available online at http://www.conservative.org/
financereform/report.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2002).
141. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 101 (2001).
142. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,616 (1996).
143. Campaign Finance Reform Legislation: The Role of Political Parties: Hearing
Before the House Oversight Comm., 104th Cong. 10-11 (1995) (statement of Haley S.
Barbour, former Chairman, Republican National Committee).
144. 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001).
145. Id. at 2362-66.
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organize themselves along similar lines as ideological corporations by
setting up an educational fund or a PAC. In Colorado Republican II, two
theories were advanced: (1) that parties were unique and could therefore
do unlimited coordinated expenditures' 46 and (2) that parties were just
like any other group.147 The Court embraced the latter position.'4 The
logic of parties being treated like any other group is that they are not just
candidate-election organizations and they have the rights of any other
group, especially amplifying the voices of members in issue advocacy.
The Court plainly said as much: "Parties . . . perform functions more
complex than simply electing candidates [and] . . . [i]t is the accepted
understanding that a party combines its members' power to speak by
aggregating contributions and broadcasting messages more widely than
individual contributors generally could afford to do .... ."'4 Thus, there
is no constitutional warrant for depriving parties of "soft money" for
such activity.
In many contexts, the Supreme Court has also recognized the
constitutionally significant role played by political parties in our
democratic Republic, undercutting any asserted interest in restricting
them as current campaign finance "reforms" propose. In 2000, the
Supreme Court struck down California's blanket primary law because it
unconstitutionally interfered with political parties' protected political
association.9 As Justice Scalia wrote for seven justices: "Representative
democracy in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without
the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate
candidates who espouse their political views. The formation of national
political parties was almost concurrent with the formation of the
Republic itself."'' Justice O'Connor has recognized:
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and
stable two-party system in this country has contributed
enormously to sound and effective government. The
preservation and health of our political institutions, state and
federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of
146. Id. at 2360-61 ("The Party's argument that its coordinated spending, like its
independent spending should be left free from restriction under the Buckley line of cases
boils down to this: because a party's most important speech is aimed at electing candidates
and is itself expressed through those candidates, any limit on party support for a candidate
imposes a unique First Amendment burden.").
147. Id. at 2361.
148. Id. at 2362-66.
149. Id. at 2364-65.
150. See generally Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
151. Id. at 2408.
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our two-party system, which permits both stability and
measured change.
"Measured change," however, is not often the goal of incumbent
politicians before most elections. This realization could go a long way
toward explaining why incumbent politicians in the Senate favor
reducing the impact political parties traditionally have in mobilizing
voters to support challengers in competitive races. Political scientists
have long recognized that political parties are the most influential
institution in the electoral process for creating greater turnover in
legislatures. 153  Indeed, increasing the role of political parties is the
practical formula for improving many of the ills McCain-Feingold
purports to address.'-"
In 1976, a bi-partisan group of over three hundred professional
political scientists and political practitioners formed the Committee for
Party Renewal. 155 In 1984, the Committee issued Principles of Strong
Party Organization,56 which, based on the consensus views of these
political scientists, advocated that:
(1) Political parties should govern themselves ....
(2) Political parties should use caucuses and conventions to
draft platforms and endorse candidates ....
(3) Political party organization should be open and broadly
based at the local level ....
152. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 244 (1989); Republican
Party of Conn. v. Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208, 214-15(1986); Democratic Party of United States
v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 121-22 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,
487-88 (1975); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-29 (1974); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735,754 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
153. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIs, THE DAY AFTER REFORM:
SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 158 (1998)
("Political parties ... consistently gave disproportionately to candidates who were in close
races, especially challengers and open-seat candidates. Party spending, therefore, seems
to be an important vehicle for satisfying one of the two major goals of campaign finance
reform: encouraging electoral competition.").
154. Anthony Gierzynski & David A. Breaux, The Role of Parties in Legislative
Campaign Financing, 15 AM. REV. OF POLITICS 171-189 (1994) ( "[l]ncreasing the party
role would reduce the gap between incumbent revenues and challenger revenues.").
Furthermore, "a greater role for parties in financing elections would result in more
equitable distribution of campaign money and a greater level of competition in legislative
campaigns." Id. at 172.
155. COMMITEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLE (1977),
available at http://www.apsanet.org/-pop/declaration.htm.
156. COMMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL, THE PRINCIPLES OF STRONG PARTY
ORGANIZATION (1984), available at http://www.apsanet.org/-pop/strong-party.htm
(italics omitted).
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(4) Political parties should advance a public agenda ....
(5) Political parties should endorse candidates for public office.
(6) Political parties should be effective campaign organizations.
(7) Political parties should be a major financier of candidate
campaigns ....
(8) Political parties should be the principal instruments of
governance ....
(9) Political parties should maintain regular internal
communications ....
(10? Election law should encourage strong political parties
McCain-Feingold violates these principles, weakening political parties to
the detriment of the Republic. Thus, McCain-Feingold is not only
unconstitutional, it is also irrational.
1. McCain-Feingold Federalizes Many Activities of State and Local
Political Parties
McCain-Feingold federalizes many activities of state and local political
parties. Under McCain-Feingold, if there is a federal candidate on the
ballot, any "federal election activity" must be paid for with money raised
under the limits of federal law, not with money raised lawfully under
state law.'58 "Federal election activity" includes "voter registration"
during the 120 days before an election, "voter identification, get-out-the-
vote activity, or [any activity promoting a political party]."'59 Therefore,
if state and local political parties participate in "federal election activity,"
they must use "hard money" (money subject to FECA restrictions) for
such activity if a federal candidate is on the ballot.
These activities are traditional activities that state and local parties
have always been involved with and that the national political parties
have supported. The fact that there is a federal candidate on the ballot,
along with the state and local candidates for whom state and local parties
have the greater concern, does not justify federalizing and limiting these
activities.
157. Id.
158. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 323 (2001).
159. Id.
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2. McCain-Feingold Prohibits National Political Parties from Using Soft
Money to Pursue Issue Advocacy, Legislative, and Organizational
Activities
Because McCain-Feingold prohibits the raising of "soft money" by
national political parties,"6 these parties would have no such money
available for issue advocacy, legislative, and organizational activities. It
treats national political parties as if they were just federal-candidate
election machines. As a result, McCain-Feingold has effectively
amputated the other important, historical activities of political parties.
These restrictions fail constitutional muster. Political parties enjoy the
same unfettered right to participate in issue advocacy as other entities,
which is especially appropriate because advancing a broad range of issues
is their raison d'etre 6' Reforms banning political parties from receiving
and spending so-called soft money cannot be justified as preventing
corruption (the only possible compelling interest), since the Supreme
Court has already held that interest insufficient for restricting issue
advocacy in Buckley.'6 If individuals and narrow interest groups enjoy
the basic First Amendment freedom to discuss issues and the position of
candidates on those issues, how can political parties, which have wide
bases of interests that are necessarily tempered and diffused, be deprived
of the right to engage in such issue advocacy?
However, proponents of abolishing "soft money" argue that this is
simply a "contribution limit."' 63 The fallacy of that argument, of course,
is that the Supreme Court has justified contribution limits only on the
ground that large contributions create the reality or appearance of quid
pro quo corruption,' 64 which cannot justify a limit on issue advocacy.'
6
Furthermore, the proposed ban on soft money contributions cannot be
justified on the theory that political parties corrupt federal candidates,
160. S. 27,107th Cong. §§ 101,323 (2001).
161. See, e.g., Republican Party Platform 2000, available at http://www.rnc.org/
gopinfo/platform, and America 2000: Democratic Party Platform, available at
http://www.democrats.org/about/platform.htm.
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
163. Amicus Curiae Brief of U.S. Senators Carl Levin, John D. McCain, and Russell
D. Feingold at 9, Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, Nos. 98-5263, 98-5364, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28505 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6,1998).
164. See generally James Bopp, Jr., All Contribution Limits Are Not Created Equal:
New Hope in the Political Speech Wars, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 11 (1999); James Bopp, Jr.,
Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 235 (1998-
99).
165. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
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which the Supreme Court rejected in Colorado Republican II.1 6 In that
case, the FEC took the position that independent, uncoordinated
expenditures by political parties ought to be treated as contributions to
the benefitted candidate. 67 Such treatment would have resulted in
allowing individuals, candidates, and political action committees to spend
unlimited amounts of money on independent expenditures to advocate
the election of a candidate, while limiting the amount a political party
could spend for the same purpose.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the FEC, noting that "[w]e are not
aware of any special dangers of corruption associated with political
parties. ' 6  After observing that individuals could contribute more
money to political parties ($20,000) than to candidates ($1,000) and
PACs ($5,000) and after recognizing that the "FECA permits
unregulated 'soft money' contributions to a party for certain activities,"
the Court concluded that the "opportunity for corruption posed by these
greater opportunities for contributions is, at best, attenuated."' ' The
Court continued in this vein with respect to the FEC's proposed ban on
political party independent expenditures, which has a direct application
to McCain-Feingold's ban on "soft money" contributions:
[R]ather than indicating a special fear of the corruptive
influence of political parties, the legislative history [of the Act]
demonstrates Congress' general desire to enhance what was
seen as an important and legitimate role for political parties in
American elections .... We therefore believe that this Court's
prior case law controls the outcome here. We do not see how a
Constitution that grants to individuals, candidates, and ordinary
political committees the right to make unlimited independent
expenditures could deny the same right to political parties. 70
The concurring justices also found little, if any, opportunity for party
corruption of candidates because of parties' very nature and structure."'
The Supreme Court echoed the same theme with respect to the
independent expenditures of political action committees:
The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or
reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political
messages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called corruption,
166. 518 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1996).
167. Id. at 619.
168. Id. at 616.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 618.
171. Id. at 626 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
see also id. at 631 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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for one of the essential features of democracy 2is the
presentation to the electorate of varying points of view.'
If this is true of PACs, then a fortiori there can be no corruption or
appearance of corruption resulting from issue advocacy by political
parties.
In addition, the Supreme Court in MCFL provided further guidance
on whether the threat of corruption is posed by an organization such as a
political party." The Court considered the ban on independent
expenditures by corporations under 2 U.S.C. § 441b. 74 The MCFL Court
evaluated whether there was any risk of corruption with regard to an
MCFL-type organization that would justify such a ban on its political
speech. 75  While the Court considered whether an ideological
corporation was sufficiently like a business corporation to justify the ban
on using corporate dollars for independent expenditures, there are
several transferable concepts to evaluating the threat of corruption posed
by a political party. 76
The concern raised by the FEC in MCFL was that § 441b served to
prevent corruption by "prevent[ing] an organization from using an
individual's money for purposes that the individual may not support."'
The Court found that "[t]his rationale for regulation is not compelling
with respect" to MCFL-type organizations because "[i]ndividuals who
contribute to [an MCFL-type organization] are fully aware of its political
purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support those
purposes.' ' 78 "[I]ndividuals contribute to a political organization in part
because they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of
advocacy than spending the money under their own personal
direction.', 79 Finally, the Court found that "a contributor dissatisfied
with how funds are used can simply stop contributing."' ° Thus, the
Court held that the prohibitions on corporate contributions and
expenditures in § 441b could not be constitutionally applied to nonprofit
ideological corporations that do not serve as a conduit for business
corporation contributions.''
172. FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,498 (1985).
173. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238,252 & n.6 (1986).
174. Id. at 241.
175. See id. at 263-64.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 260.
17& Id. at 260-61.
179. Id. at 261.
180. Id.; see also Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1363-65 (8th Cir. 1994).
181. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263-64.
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Political parties similarly pose no risk of corruption because people
give money to parties precisely because they support what the political
party stands for.182 A contribution to a political party is for the purpose
of enhancing advocacy of the issues that the party represents. Any
individual unhappy with the use of the money may simply quit
contributing and leave the political party. In sum, the threat of
corruption cannot justify a limit on issue advocacy, and, even if it could,
political parties pose no threat of corruption to their candidates.
The Supreme Court found that, just as independent expenditures of
interest groups pose no danger of corrupting candidates, neither do those
of political parties."' While no one disputes that expenditures on express
advocacy actually coordinated with candidates are properly contributions
to the candidate because of the possibility of quid pro quo corruption,
the Court held that coordination must be proven as a matter of fact; it
cannot be presumed."" "Reforms" may not presume coordination where
it does not actually exist.
Those who would attempt to justify the new restrictions on political
parties in McCain-Feingold on the ground that the Supreme Court
upheld limits on individual and political committee contributions to
candidates in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC l. are wrong.
On April 10, 2001, just eight days after McCain-Feingold passed the
Senate, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska
followed the Supreme Court's numerous precedents by recognizing the
unique associational interests embraced by political parties and held that
a state statute was unconstitutional as applied to "soft money"
contributions under state law to political parties.' 6 The Court held that
political parties have a constitutional right to maintain separate accounts
to fund issue advocacy and voter mobilization programs."" Furthermore,
it held that the government has no interest sufficiently important to
justify the imposition of limits on contributions to those accounts.
18
"Soft money" bans are unconstitutional.'89
182. See id.
183. Id. at 260-63.
184. Id. at 248-49, 263-65.
185. 120 S. Ct. 897, 908-10 (2000).
186. Jacobus v. Alaska, No. A97-0272, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12905, at *29-*30 (D.
Alaska Apr. 10, 2001).
187. Id. at *21-*23.
188. Id. at *29-*30.
189. See Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money. Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition
on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 180 (1998).
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In addition to being unconstitutional, the soft money ban in McCain-
Feingold is actually counter-productive in the eyes of political scientists
based on the unique role political parties play in the electoral process.190
In a college political science textbook about campaign finance published
in 2000, the author, himself a proponent of other reforms, praised the
effects of soft money for creating increased voter turnout:
Party soft money can be spent on issue advertisements - the
"air war" - or on identifying, registering, and getting voters to
the polling places - the "ground war." Both of these uses -
especially the latter - should be seen as positive developments.
Issue advertisements can strengthen the parties by allowing the
parties a role in setting the electoral agenda. Identifying,
registering, and getting voters to the polls increases
participation - including groups underrepresented in the
pluralist system - and cannot be seen as anything but positive. 91
Thus, because of the unique, constitutionally important role played by
political parties, any effort to improve the electoral process ought to
"steer money to the political parties and encourage them to use that
money for activities that reinvigorate U.S. elections."' Furthermore, as
one prominent proponent of campaign finance reform has conceded,
political parties are the solution rather than the problem: "For political
parties, there seems little alternative to simply legitimizing what has
already happened de facto: the abolition of all limits . . . . [S]uch an
outcome is not to be lamented. Political parties deserve more fundraising
freedom, which would give these critical institutions a more substantial
role in elections."1 93
Thus, there is no justification, in either policy or law, for the severe
limits on national, state, and local political parties that McCain-Feingold
imposes. Although the House version of the campaign finance reform
190. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN
AMERICA (2000).
191. Id. at 125. This view of political parties is nothing new. See WALTER DEAN
BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 133
(1970). Burnham stated that:
[P]olitical parties, with all of their well-known human and structural
shortcomings, are the only devices thus far invented by the wit of Western man
which with some effectiveness can generate countervailing collective power on
behalf of the many individuals powerless against the relatively few who are
individually - or organizationally - powerful.
Id.
192. GIERZYNSKI, supra note 190, at 125.
193. LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS 334 (1996)
(emphasis in original) (referring specifically to "soft money" contributions).
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bill has similarities to McCain-Feingold, it is no more rational or
constitutional.
IV. SHAYS-MEEHAN SIMILARLY ASSAULTS THE POLITICAL LIBERTIES
OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION
In the U.S. House of Representatives, House Bill 380 (the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001) is commonly known as Shays-
Meehan.194  Like McCain-Feingold, Shays-Meehan would severely
restrict the ability of citizen groups to communicate with the public
regarding the positions and voting records of public office candidates and
incumbents - or even upcoming votes in Congress. Because many of the
flaws of the two bills overlap and because Shays-Meehan has
disappeared into committee, this section will briefly highlight the
features and flaws of Shays-Meehan, relying on the constitutional
analysis already provided in the discussion of McCain-Feingold.
In general, Shays-Meehan would impose a year-round prohibition on
unions and corporations (including citizen groups) from paying for public
communications that an FEC regulator might consider "for the purpose
of influencing a Federal election," if that communication is pursuant to
any "general or particular understanding with a candidate," '195 or if the
citizen group has any of several broad categories of direct, indirect,
presumed, or actual links to a candidate. 6 These prohibitions apply
"regardless of whether the.., communication.., is express advocacy. ' '..7
Even if a group seeks to avoid coordination by avoiding virtually all
two-way conversation with its congressmen, or other candidates, the
organization must avoid issuing communications that comment favorably
or critically on a candidate year round because of the broad definition of
"express advocacy." 198 Even avoiding such "coordination" or "express
advocacy" is insufficient in the sixty-day blackout period before
194. Shays-Meehan, H.R. 380 (107th Cong., 2001), is available online at the U.S.
Congress' Web site at http://www.thomas.loc.gov. Page cites in this analysis are to the
PDF document found there. As of March 15, 2001, H.R. 380 was referred to the
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Education and Workforce
Committee, where it has remained until the writing of this article in November 2001.
195. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 206 (2001). An example of this activity would be an
understanding that an organization would publicize which candidates sign a "pledge" form
on a certain bill.
196. Id. § 101. "Candidate" includes all federal incumbents (unless they have
announced retirement) from the day after election. Id. Therefore, a senator is a candidate
for his or her entire six year term.
197. Id. §§ 201(c), 206.
198. Id. § 201(b).
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elections, during which even mentioning a candidate's name would be
deemed express advocacy of the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate and therefore forbidden on broadcast media to corporations
and labor unions. 9 Shays-Meehan would only permit such forms of
speech to PACs, which would seriously restrict the rights of citizen
groups wanting to engage in issue advocacy.
Shays-Meehan purports to make an exception for voting records and
voter guides, but the exception would deprive citizen groups of their
current ability to express a viewpoint on the issues being discussed, e.g.,
by making "correct" answers all pluses and "incorrect" answers all
minuses.2® Thus, the sort of voter guides typically done by citizen groups
would be banned under this alleged "exception."
A. Year-Round Restrictions and Sixty-Day Blackouts Ignore the High
Express-Advocacy Wall
As noted in Part I, a high wall of separation divides the liberty of
unfettered political issue advocacy from express advocacy. Nonetheless,
Shays-Meehan attempts to move that constitutionally-dictated wall by
expanding the reach of express advocacy. Section 201 expands the
definition of "express advocacy" to include "words that in context can
have no reasonable meaning other than to advocate the election or
defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates" or "expressing
unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to one or more
clearly identified candidates when taken as a whole and with limited
reference to external events, such as proximity to an election."20'
These incursions into protected issue advocacy territory would include
virtually any sort of commentary on the voting records or positions of
politicians. Disgruntled candidates would complain to the FEC if they
thought commentary was negative, and if it was positive their opponents
would file the complaint. On contentious social issues, value judgments
on a candidate's view would be difficult to state without triggering a
possible complaint under Shays-Meehan's standard of "unmistakable and
unambiguous support for or opposition to" a candidate. 2°2 These year-
round restrictions are supplemented by a sixty-day blackout period
before primary and general elections when corporations and unions are
199. Id. § 201.
200. Id. § 201(b)(20)(B).
201. Id. § 201.
202. Id. § 201(b)(20)(B)(i).
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banned from even "referring to one or more clearly identified candidates
in a paid advertisement that is transmitted through radio or television." 203
Measuring these proposed restrictions against the constitutional
standard reveals their constitutional shortcomings. It is impossible to
imagine that the First Amendment, which requires the express advocacy
bright line to protect issue advocacy, will countenance a law that
proscribes the mere mention of a politician's name in a broadcast
advertisement sixty days before an election.
While slightly less blatant, the definition of express advocacy that
speaks of "unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to
one or more clearly identified candidates when taken as a whole and with
limited references to external events, such as proximity to an election" 2°4
clearly goes beyond the Supreme Court's definition, which requires
examination of the words of the communication itself, without outside
references, to see if there are explicit words that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 25 The key terms of
Shays-Meehan, such as "unmistakable and unambiguous support,"
"anything of value," and "in connection with,'  are terms of subjective
judgment and therefore are beyond the scope of the objective criteria
that the Supreme Court authorized in this crucial First Amendment area.
With the new mandatory prison sentences that Shays-Meehan would
authorize,207 the language is too ambiguous and too far into the protected
territory of issue advocacy for the Supreme Court to sustain it. And
name-or-likeness, blackout periods have been found unconstitutional in
the federal courts.208
B. The Voter Guide "Exception" Ignores the High Express-Advocacy
Wall
Shays-Meehan provides an "exception" to the year-round ban on
commentary on politicians by corporations or unions for publication of
voter guides and voting records.2°9 However, such score cards typically
characterize politicians' point of view as positive or negative and include
203. Id. § 201(b) (noting that for the President and Vice President, the sixty-day
blackout is only before the general election).
204. Id. § 201(b)(20)(A)(iii).
205. See supra Part I.
206. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2001) (stating that "'[cloordinated activity'
means anything of value provided by a person in connection with a Federal candidate's
election .... ).
207. Id. § 1201.
208. See supra Part III.A.
209. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 206 (2001).
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explicit commentary. All of this would be forbidden by Shays-Meehan.
Under the bill, a scorecard would be an illegal corporate campaign
contribution year-round unless it:21
[1.] presents information solely about the voting record or
position on a campaign issue of one or more candidates
(including any statement by the sponsor of the voting record or
voting guide of its agreement or disagreement with the record
or position of a candidate), so long as the voting record or
voting guide when taken as a whole does not express
unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to
one or more clearly identified candidates;
[2.] is not coordinated activity ... [and questions to candidates
may only be in writing]; and
[3.] does not contain [express advocacy] or words that in context
can have no reasonable meaning other than to urge the election
or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates. T
Measuring these restrictions on issue advocacy against the
constitutional standard, it is clear that Shays-Meehan has gone astray.
The words regulated are not explicit words that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, as the Supreme Court
has held that the Constitution mandates.212 The words would be subject
to rulemaking by the FEC, which has often demonstrated that it believes
it can sense such an "urge," even when it is not expressed in explicit
words.2 3 The presumption of coordination that is obvious in the second
point is based on an unconstitutional concept of coordination.214
210. However, even if a communication meets all of the government-imposed speech
specifications, it would still be forbidden if it is deemed to be coordinated with a candidate
or party, a term that is defined in the bill with broad expansiveness. H.R. 380, 107th Cong.
§ 206 (2001).
211. Id. § 201.
212. See supra Part I.
213. The specific conditions set forth in the definition of "express advocacy" and the
voter guide exception track past attempts by the FEC to regulate commentary on
politicians that have been repeatedly invalidated under the First Amendment. For
example, the "unambiguous support" definition of "express advocacy" is similar to a 1995
definition declared unconstitutional by the First Circuit in Maine Right to Life Committee,
Inc. v. FEC. 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996). It is also similar to the FEC's "circumstances"
definition emphatically rejected by the Fourth Circuit in FEC v. Christian Action Network.
110 F.3d 1049, 1056-57, 1061-62 (4th Cir. 1997). Its controls of speech content and tone in
voter guides are similar to FEC regulations declared unconstitutional by the First Circuit
in FEC v. Clifton. 114 F.3d 1309, 1317 (1st Cir. 1997). For a detailed discussion of these
and other cases, see Bopp & Coleson, supra note 6.
214. See supra Part III.C.
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Therefore, the restriction is unconstitutional, and the exception is a
meaningless gesture, pretending to offer what it withholds.
C. Allowing Only PACs to Comment Ignores the High Express-Advocacy
Wall
Shays-Meehan would ban expenditures by citizen groups to comment
on incumbents or candidates except through a PAC, with all the
attendant compliance burdens. This would silence many small citizen
groups that lack the resources to consult specialist lawyers and to hire
accountants and compliance staff to meet the complex and burdensome
compliance requirements. This is unconstitutional.
In MCFL,2"5 the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to
enforce FECA to prohibit nonprofit, issue-oriented corporations from
making expenditures even for express advocacy, or to require that it be
done through a PAC."6 The Court described the speech-suppressing
effect of such a policy as "substantial" and enumerated the burdens of
complex compliance requirements on small, simple citizen groups.217 The
Court held that there was no justification for such burdens because such
groups posed no danger of corruption, the only possible justification for
such a law.1 8 If there is no justification for limiting the express advocacy
of such citizen groups, there can be no justification to so limit their issue
advocacy by including it in a flawed, overreaching definition of "express
advocacy."
Even those groups with the resources and sophistication to operate a
PAC would be severely limited because of existing restrictions on PACs.
For example, no person may contribute more than $5,000 per year to a
particular PAC, PACs connected to a parent-citizen group may solicit
PAC contributions only from group members, and the name of all
donors over $200 must be reported.219 Shays-Meehan would reduce the
contribution amount requiring reporting to $50.m- Thus, Shays-Meehan
would sharply reduce the amount of commentary about incumbent
politicians and candidates, which is obviously the unconstitutional goal.
215. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
216. Id. at 253-56, 263-64.
217. Id. at 252-56.
218. Id. at 263-65.
219. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a), 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B)(C), and 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A).
220. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 303 (2001).
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D. "Coordinated Activity" Sets a Trap
Shays-Meehan would also suppress issue advocacy by trying to make
much of it a forbidden corporate contribution. The bill does this by
ignoring the express advocacy line and expanding the meaning of
"coordination with a candidate," laying a trap for the unwary through
numerous tripwires triggering "coordination."22' Section 206 of the bill
defines "coordinated activity" as
221. Breaking out the language of the coordination provision, section 206 of Shays-
Meehan provides the following tripwires that trigger "coordination" under the bill: (1)
cooperation with candidate; (2) consultation with candidate; (3) in concert with candidate;
(4) at request of candidate; (5) at suggestion of candidate; (6) pursuant to general
understanding with candidate; (7) pursuant to particular understanding with candidate; (8)
use of part of campaign material of candidate; (9) person is employee of candidate's
committee; (10) person is a fund raiser for candidate's committee; (11) person is agent of
candidate's committee; (12) person was member of candidate's committee; (13) person
was employee of candidate's committee; (14) person was fund raiser for candidate's
committee; (15) person was agent for candidate's committee; (16) person retains
professional services of any person who has provided polling services to candidate; (17)
person retains professional service of any person who is providing polling services to
candidate; (18) person retains professional services of any person who has provided media
advice to candidate; (19) person retains professional services of any person who is
providing media advise to candidate; (20) person retains professional services of any
person who has provided fundraising services to candidate; (21) person retains
professional services of any person who is providing fundraising services to candidate; (22)
person retains professional services of any person who has provided campaign research to
candidate; (23) person retains professional services of any person who is providing
campaign research to candidate; (24) person retains professional services of any person
who has provided direct mail services to candidate; (25) person retains professional
services of any person who is providing direct mail services to candidate; (26) person has
participated in discussions with candidate regarding advertising; (27) person has
participated in discussions with candidate regarding message; (28) person has participated
in discussions with candidate regarding allocation of resources; (29) person has
participated in discussions with candidate regarding fund raising; (30) person has
participated in discussions with candidate regarding campaign operations; (31) person has
participated in discussions with candidate regarding campaign tactics; (32) person has
participated in discussions with candidate regarding campaign strategy; (33) person has
communicated with agent of candidate's committee regarding advertising; (34) person has
communicated with agent of candidate's committee regarding; (35) person has
communicated with agent of candidate's committee regarding allocation of resources; (36)
person has communicated with agent of candidate's committee regarding fund raising;
(37) person has communicated with agent of candidate's committee regarding campaign
operations; (38) person has communicated with agent of candidate's committee regarding
campaign tactics; (39) person has communicated with agent of candidate's committee
regarding campaign strategies; (40) person has participated in discussions with candidate's
coordinating political party regarding advertising; (41.) person has participated in
discussions with candidate's coordinating political party regarding message; (42) person
has participated in discussions with candidate's coordinating political party regarding
allocation of resources; (43) person has participated in discussions with candidate's
coordinating political party regarding fundraising; (44) person has participated in
discussions with candidate's coordinating political party regarding campaign tactics; (45)
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anything of value provided by a person in connection with a
Federal candidate's election who is ... acting in coordination
with that candidate ... (regardless of whether the value
provided is in the form of a communication which [sic] expressly
advocates a vote for or against any candidate) [and includes]
payment[s] made.., pursuant to any general.., understanding
as well as payments presumed to be coordinated because of common
use by the person and a candidate of "professional services.
222
As described above, the government may only regulate express
advocacy, not issue advocacy.2  Therefore, only communications
constituting express advocacy ought to be treated as contributions. The
Supreme Court has held and reaffirmed that the high wall of separation
between unfettered issue advocacy and express advocacy is mandated by
the U.S. Constitution to prevent both vagueness and overbreadth. 224
Shays-Meehan's "coordinated activity" language suffers from both.
1. "Coordinated Activity" Ignores the Express Advocacy Line and Is
Unconstitutionally Vague
Shays-Meehan's "coordinated activity" language violates the due
process guarantee against vague laws, which is particularly troubling in
the First Amendment context. Where government seeks to regulate
political speech 'so closely touching our most precious freedoms,'
precision of regulation must be the touchstone. ''22' A lack of specificity
poses a severe threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights. As the
Supreme Court explained, such vague laws threaten to "trap the innocent
by not providing fair warning," they give reign to "arbitrary and
discriminatory application," and they force citizens to "steer far wider of
the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked." 226  Hence, "[t]o avoid uncertainty, and therefore
invalidation of a regulation of political speech, the Supreme Court in
Buckley, established a bright-line test."227 This test limits regulation to
person has participated in discussions with candidate's coordinating political party
regarding campaign strategy. See H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 206 (2001).
222. Id.
223. See supra Part I.
224. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1986).
225. Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976)).
226. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n. 48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108-09 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Iowa Right to Life, 187 F.3d at 969.
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communications that "contain express language of advocacy with an
exhortation to elect or defeat a candidate."
Shays-Meehan ignores this necessity for a bright line. Instead, the bill
reaches "anything of value ... in connection with a Federal candidate's
election ... regardless of whether the value provided is in the form of a
communication which expressly advocates a vote for or against any
candidate." 9 While this regulation by its own terms extends well beyond
the realm of express advocacy, its outer boundaries cannot be discerned
with any degree of certainty.
Such failure to limit the scope to express advocacy cannot be tolerated
by the First Amendment. As the Eighth Circuit explained in striking
down an Iowa law that did provide some guidance:
[A]bsent the bright-line limitation in Buckley, "the distinction
between issue discussion (in the context of electoral politics)
and candidate advocacy would be sufficiently indistinct that the
right of citizens to engage in the vigorous discussion of issues of
public interest without fear of official reprisal would be
intolerably chilled. " 0
Even if the speech is "coordinated" with a candidate, it does nothing to
alleviate its vagueness. A blurring of the lines between express advocacy
and issue advocacy poses the identical threats of uncertain prohibitions
and selective enforcement regardless of whether the communications are
coordinated. As the Supreme Court has explained,
the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve
in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are
intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals
and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on
the basis of their positions on various public issues, but
campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest.3
Discussions of issues and candidates do not cease to overlap simply
because the speaker coordinates its message with a politician. In fact, the
same intimate link between candidates and issues that necessitates a
bright regulatory line also makes coordination with candidates an
invaluable aid to the effective promotion of issues.
228. Id. at 969-70.
229. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 206 (2001)
230. Iowa Right to Life, 187 F.3d at 970 (quoting FEC v. Christian Action Network,
Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir 1997)).
231. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
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Indeed, the uncertainty posed by vague regulations may actually pose
a greater threat to free speech and association in this context than in the
uncoordinated contexts analyzed in Buckley and MCFL because the
burdens posed by investigation are likely to be substantially greater. To
determine a violation under Shays-Meehan, the FEC would have to
evaluate not merely the communication itself, but also whether it had
been coordinated with the identified candidate. Exploring and
establishing whether or not coordination actually occurred may
necessitate an incredibly burdensome and intrusive investigation into the
affairs of both the organization and the candidate. Such a burdensome
investigation would, in and of itself, strip the organization of its First
Amendment rights.
Unlike other regulatory agencies, the "subject matter which the FEC
oversees... relates to the behavior of individuals and groups only insofar
as they act, speak and associate for political purposes." 2 Accordingly, the
scope of the FEC's investigatory powers is more limited than that of
other agencies 3 3 This is so because the investigative process itself "tends
to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or
press, freedom of political association, and freedom of communication of
ideas." '3
If an investigation targets a group's lawful issue advocacy, "[t]he First
Amendment may be invoked against infringement of the protected
freedoms."' 5 This is so because the Supreme Court has found that the
mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against his
will, about his beliefs, expressions, or associations is a measure of
government interference.26 Such disclosures "can seriously infringe on
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment."237
As demonstrated by the FEC's attempt to enforce a coordination
provision against the Christian Coalition, an investigation into whether
issue advocacy has been coordinated can impose a severe burden upon
speakers engaging in constitutionally protected activity3 8 The FEC's
attempt led to lengthy discovery and voluminous facts, which were
232. FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 387 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (citing 2 U.S. C. §§ 431,441a) (emphasis in original).
233. See id.
234. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,245 (1957).
235. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957).
236. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
237. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
238. FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999).
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established by testimony and documents from numerous individuals,
including a former president of the United States. 39
2. "Coordination With a Candidate" Is Expanded Beyond Court-
Defined Boundaries
Shays-Meehan also expands the concept of "coordination with a
candidate." Section 206 of the bill defines "coordinated activity" as:
[A]nything of value provided by a person in connection with a
Federal candidate's election who is (or at any time during the
same election cycle has been) acting in coordination with that
candidate (or an agent of that candidate) on any campaign
activity in connection with a Federal election in which such
candidate seeks nomination or election to Federal office
(regardless of whether the value provided is in the form of a
communication which [sic] expressly advocates a vote for or
against any candidate), and includes any of the following .... 241
The list that follows includes (1) "[a] payment made by a person in
cooperation ... with, at the request or suggestion of, or pursuant to a
general or particular understanding with a candidate." 24'
Current constitutional law provides that coordination with a candidate
requires that the citizen group have an actual prior communication about
a specific expenditure for a specific project that results in the expenditure
being under the control of a candidate or being based on information
provided by the candidate about the candidate's plans or needs.242 The
new definition above is vastly expansive and places citizen groups that
lobby and incumbent politicians at risk. For example, the mere
discussion with a member of Congress about a candidate's "message"
(such as a specific bill introduced by that member of Congress) any time
during the two-year term of office would create coordination.
Thereafter, the citizen group would be forbidden at any time in any
manner to make any public communication that would be "of value" to
the lawmaker because it would be an illegal corporate campaign
contribution. In addition, literature promoting a congressman's bill in his
home state could become a contribution. Because judicial precedent is
clearly to the contrary, this provision will not withstand judicial scrutiny.
239. See id. at 93, 94 n.56.
240. H.R. 308, 107th Cong. § 206 (2001) (emphasis added).
241. Id.
242. See supra Part III.D.
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3. Coordination With Shared "Professionals" May Be Presumed
Section 206 of Shays-Meehan further creates a presumption of
coordination, converting both issue advocacy and express advocacy to
forbidden contributions, where
the person making the payment retains the professional services
[defined as "polling, media advice, fundraising, campaign
research or direct mail"] of any person that has provided or is
providing those services in the same election cycle to a
candidate (including services provided through a political
committee of the candidate's political party) in connection with
the candidate's pursuit of nomination for election, or election,
to Federal office, ... and the person retained is retained to
work on activities relating to that candidate's campaign."'
This provision amounts to an unconstitutional penalty on free speech.
An incorporated citizen group cannot be forced to forfeit its right to
associate freely with legitimate providers of professional services in order
to exercise its freedom of speech. Moreover, a vendor at any point
during an election cycle could unilaterally decide to sell election-related
services to a candidate, thereby canceling the free speech rights of all the
vendor's PAC clients regarding that candidate. In some areas, there may
be only one or two vendors of a specific service that a PAC requires to
make its independent expenditure, and this bill could consequently
eliminate the ability to make PAC expenditures.
The First Amendment permits spending limits to be applied to an
express advocacy expenditure only if that expenditure has actually been
discussed between the candidate and the person or citizen group.
Coordination may not be presumed on the basis of some relationship. In
Colorado Republican H, 4 the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the
FEC's position that a political party expenditure may be presumed
coordinated with the party's federal candidate.2 45 The Court declared
that the proper test was to determine whether the specific expenditure
was in fact the subject of communication between those making the
expenditure and the candidate.2" If the Constitution forbids applying
such a coordination presumption between a party and its nominee, the
same principle plainly applies in the present situation.
243. H.R. 308, 107th Cong. § 206 (2001).
244. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
245. Id. at 619-26.
246. Id. at 617-18, 622.
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E. The Congressional Member Endorsement Ban Violates Free
Expression
Section 101 of Shays-Meehan would prohibit members of Congress
from endorsing the fundraising efforts of citizen groups that use any part
of the money for communications to the public by any medium at any
time of the year that "promotes," "supports," "attacks," or "opposes"
any candidate.2 7 This would encompass many routine communications
by a citizen group to promote pending legislation. Political party officials
would also be prohibited from raising money for any 501(c)(3) (including
charities), 501(c)(4), or 527 organizations.
2 41
F. Advance Notice Requirements Permit Interference With Speech
Section 204 of Shays-Meehan requires that independent expenditures
be reported as soon as any contract is signed for the communication,
which could be weeks or months in advance of the dissemination of the
communication to the public.149 As noted above, this does not make
sense in the context of how such communications are really done and is
bad policy because it allows opportunity for interference with planned
communications, especially by incumbents.
G. The Mandatory Prison Sentence Chills Free Expression
Despite the added ambiguity imposed by Shays-Meehan and the
coordination traps it creates, its creators have decided to impose a
mandatory minimum one-year prison sentence for "knowing and willful"
violations of any of the above restrictions that involve a "contribution"
or "expenditure" of $2,000 or more in a calendar year.5 This, coupled
with the increasing complexity of the FECA, would cast an Alberta-
clipper level of chill over constitutionally protected free speech about
politicians, forcing many small citizen groups into silence and greatly
encumbering the more sophisticated with the need to "hedge and trim,"
as the United States Supreme Court described it in Buckley.2'
V. CONCLUSION
Issue advocacy in the context of electoral politics enjoys absolute First
Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has defined only a narrow
247. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 101 (2001).
248. Id. § 201.
249. Id. § 204; see also supra Part III.D.
250. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 1201(2001).
251. 424 U.S. 1,43 (1976).
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scope of non-issue advocacy that can be regulated-only explicit words
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate. Congress cannot eviscerate this bright line test with a no-
advocacy, no-reference test. Political parties are not excluded from this
protection and cannot be constitutionally forbidden from receiving and
expending "soft money." There is no need for exclusion because by their
nature political parties are incapable of corrupting their own candidates.
Congress cannot take away the constitutional right to engage in
unfettered issue advocacy and unlimited independent expenditures by
simply presuming that coordination with candidates exists. Legislatively
created labels cannot obviate the freedom of speech. The Supreme
Court has stated that:
In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government, but the people - individually as citizens and
candidates and collectively as associations and political
committees - who must retain control over the quantity and. .. . .. 252
range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.
McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan would virtually destroy the ability
of citizen groups to participate in our Republic, thereby trampling on
freedom of speech and association with respect to the most vital issues of
our day. Fortunately, the federal courts have shown greater solicitude
for the Constitution and the workings of our Republic, along with less
respect for the incumbent-protection urges of members of Congress, and
may be relied upon to promptly bury such alleged "reform." However,
members of Congress have also taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution. Passage of McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan would be
in derogation of that oath and duty.
The First Amendment is not a loophole to be plugged by
unconstitutional legislation in misguided efforts to "reform" campaign
finance. Free political speech was the first and is the best campaign
finance reform; it is the very core of what James Madison drafted and the
Framers adopted when they guaranteed the people that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 253  The First
Amendment needs no reform.
252. Id. at 57.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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